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Despite its popular currency and salience, anti-Americanism is understudied and misunderstood 
by social scientists. Even within academia, studies of anti-Americanism are often polemic, and 
logically or methodologically flawed. Focusing on Western Europe, we argue that anti-
Americanism is a public opinion phenomenon, and present a definition of anti-Americanism 
based on social psychology, and demonstrate how cognitive psychological processes shape anti-
Americanism. We outline several predictors of anti-Americanism, processes of internal 
cognition, responses to international political events, patterns of interpersonal communication 
and information diffusion, and the contextual role of ideology. We also observe the important 
implications European anti-Americanism has for support international institutions, and 
demonstrate that anti-Americanism leads to less overall support for major global actors such as 
the United Nations, the World Bank, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the European 
Union. We also argue that, because of the invasion of Iraq and the events leading up to the 
invasion, anti-Americanism in Europe has reached a new high point. 
 1
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
“Why do they hate us?” This question was heard from many quarters following the 
events of September 11, 2001, reflected not only in popular discourse, but by President Bush 
himself in a speech before a joint session of Congress ten days after the attacks on New York and 
Washington D.C.  Since that time, the topic of anti-Americanism has become even more salient, 
as the United States waged a largely unpopular war against Iraq, followed by an un-expectantly 
difficult occupation and the scandal of abuse by U.S. troops against Iraqi detainees. These events 
have in turn been followed by what was regarded by some as a successful national election in 
Iraq, and what many argued is increased stability in that country and a rejuvenated popular 
movement toward democracy in the greater Middle East, subsequently followed by an 
intensification of insurgent activity that could be characterized either as guerrilla warfare or low 
level civil war. Through all this, the United States has remained largely unpopular of the world 
stage. The topic of anti-Americanism has never been more relevant.  
Surrounding anti-Americanism’s increased popular currency is ambiguity: what is anti-
Americanism? What causes it? If “they” hate us, who exactly are “they?” Does anti-
Americanism reflect a response to U.S. policy, or is it something endemic of a society? What 
long-term effects might anti-Americanism have? These questions are not only relevant for 
popular media and the public at large, but also for academics seeking to study anti-Americanism 
as a phenomenon of public opinion. This project will be a step in the direction of addressing 
these questions.  
Review of the Literature 
Discussions of anti-Americanism in popular media abound. Not surprisingly, these 
discussions are, for the most part, partisan, polemic or both. Without getting into a review of the 
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discourse surrounding anti-Americanism in popular media (a monumental task to say the least), 
the general underlying theme depends on the political persuasion of the author. Self-identified 
conservatives such as Charles Krauthammer (2003) and Paul Johnson (2005) assert that anti-
Americanism is a phenomenon in which the United States is hated for what it is. They argue that 
it is impossible for anti-Americanism to have its roots based on negative perception of its 
policies, since, they argue, the U.S. unequivocally uplifts the spirit and condition of all of 
humanity. As such, any intense and/or systematic criticism of the United States is anti-American, 
as legitimate systematic criticism of the U.S. is basically impossible. Commentators on the left 
attempt to take a more nuanced approach to the phenomenon of anti-Americanism, attempting to 
separate it from reasoned, legitimate criticism of the U.S. and it policies (Hitchens 2002; 
Alterman 2003). According to this point of view, anti-Americanism remains a problem, however, 
and is still based on irrational prejudices, a sort of cultural pathology that has no basis in reason. 
In popular discourse, from both the political left and right, anti-Americanism is a pejorative, 
reserved for those that harbor irrational and illogical sentiment against the United States and all 
things American.  
Discussion of the topic of anti-Americanism remains highly visible in the popular media, 
with the topic coming up continually in newspaper editorials, political magazines, and on news 
stations. Yet, the academic literature on this subject is surprisingly limited. In a 1992 piece on 
the topic of anti-Americanism, Smith and Wertman (1992a: 188) noted that “though anti-
Americanism has long been a concern of the media and the U.S. policymakers,” it has been 
given little attention by scholars. Over a decade later, and despite recent outpourings of anti-
Americanism obvious not only in the attacks of September 11, but also in the aftermath of the 
war in Iraq, Smith and Wertman’s assertion still holds true. Despite its currency in popular 
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discourse, anti-Americanism is a topic that has received limited attention by academics. This 
lack of attention is probably due to two factors. First, anti-Americanism is a term that is difficult 
to conceptualize. It is hard to pin down just what anti-Americanism is. Second, it easily lends 
itself to (mis)use as a pejorative. A few intrepid social scientists have sought to explore this 
concept, though their work demonstrates both the conceptualization problem and the temptation 
to lapse into perjoratives.  
First we focus on how the scholarly literature has conceptualized and measured anti-
Americanism. Here two main views stand out. The first argues that anti-Americanism is a 
fundamentally emotional phenomenon akin to religious or racial bigotry – that people hate the 
United States for what it is rather than what is does. The United States, what it is, and what it 
stands for are what people dislike. This view stresses internal sources of anti-Americanism, since 
the fundamentally irrational sentiment that is anti-Americanism is necessarily divorced from 
reality. The second view conversely argues that anti-Americanism is a reactive phenomenon that 
is dependent on U.S. actions and policies, arguing that people react to the United States for what 
it does. This view stresses external sources of anti-Americanism, and anti-Americanism has 
reasons for existing that are entirely grounded in the reality of U.S. policy and its effects.   
Prominent in the first view of the literature on anti-Americanism is the work of 
sociologist Paul Hollander (1992: 334-335), who defines anti-Americanism as “an unfocused and 
largely irrational, often visceral, aversion towards the United States, its government, domestic 
institutions, foreign policies, prevailing values, culture, and people.” Hollander cast a wide net 
for those exhibiting anti-Americanism. Domestic examples range wildly from prominent 
linguistics scholar and leftist activist Noam Chomsky for his numerous polemics regarding U.S. 
policy, to hospice volunteer and Miss America 1988 Kaye Lani Rae Rafko, whose “anti-
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Americanism” was supposedly exposed by her stating that “society has lost its bearings” 
(Hollander 1992; 3). Domestic critics on the right such as Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell are 
conspicuously absent from Hollander’s critique. This inconsistency is not surprising as relatively 
recent commentary by Hollander on the topic of anti-Americanism has appeared in conservative 
outlets such as the Weekly Standard (2001) and The National Review (2003). Using numerous 
anecdotes, he outlines several manifestations of anti-Americanism in Europe, the United States, 
and throughout the world, such as opposition to U.S. deployment of nuclear missiles, and the 
anti-nuclear power, pro-environment, and human rights social movements, which are again, 
phenomena mainly of the left.  
Spiro (1988: 122), in an argument strikingly similar to Hollander’s, argues that anti-
Americanism is “the incomprehension or the rejection of the procedural constitutionalism and 
substantive democracy of the United States of America.” He avoids actually attempting to 
measure anti-Americanism, but rather argues it exists where there is a pattern of criticism of 
what the U.S. stands for, and that the phenomenon is largely self-evident. Looking at anti-
Americanism in Europe, he argues that it is the very values embedded in the U.S. Constitution 
that most of those demonstrating anti-Americanism despise. They literally, according to Spiro, 
hate freedom. Anti-Americanism, he argues, is primarily an elite phenomenon that will 
inevitably diminish as true (American style) democracy is spread to the people of Western 
Europe, since, he argues, Western Europe is not genuinely democratic.  
Some scholars taking this approach to studying anti-Americanism attempt to be more 
nuanced in their approach.  Haseler (1985: 6), for example, concedes that while not all criticism 
of the U.S. comes from prejudice, the bulk of this opposition, which he labels anti-American, 
stems from “opposition to the cultural and political values of the United States” and are “often 
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the product of rage based on resentment and envy.” Because of this, anti-Americanism will 
continue despite changes in policy or administrations. Ultimately anti-Americanism exists 
because of what America is, not what it does.  
Fabbrini (2002) presents what is perhaps the most nuanced example in this first view of 
anti-Americanism. He argues that anti-Americanism in Western Europe can and does result from 
external sources, but domestic ones are more important. This inherent anti-Americanism will 
persist, and become more active when aggravated by unpopular policies. Anti-Americanism can 
be dormant, waiting to be awakened by some action by the United States. 
Despite the obviously polemic nature of much of this strain of research on anti-
Americanism, it is important to point out that all of the literature referred to is, unless otherwise 
indicated, ostensibly academic in nature. While not all the literature of this particular view is so 
biased (notably Fabbrini 2002), much of it clearly has an agenda, reflecting what a recent scholar 
called “pathological” rhetorical use of the term (Mendieta 2003). A theme common to this view 
appears to be both ideological and jingoistic. Indeed, despite the pretense of being legitimate 
social science, the bulk of this literature is largely little more than thinly veiled propaganda that 
is strikingly (and disturbingly) similar to literature put out by right-wing advocacy groups and 
conservative commentators (see e.g., Berman 2004; Krauthammer 2003). The literature creates a 
false dichotomy of anti-Americanism: either a person is anti-Americanism or he/she isn’t. This 
position represents a refusal to recognize a nuanced anti-Americanism based on opposition to 
specific American actions or policies. The one important theoretical contribution this literature 
does make, most notably and impressively by Fabbrini (2002), is that it stresses an internal 
nature to anti-Americanism – that is anti-Americanism is something that originates mostly from 
within a society, rather that outside of it.  
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In a second strain of the literature on anti-Americanism, scholars have argued that anti-
Americanism is, at its core, a reaction to the policies of the United States. Where the previous 
strain of literature focused on anti-Americanism as a rejection of what the U.S. is, or stands for, 
this literature focuses mainly on what the U.S. does. These scholars present anti-Americanism as 
a reaction with international origins, and makes the case for a rational and solely cognitive anti-
Americanism with varying degrees of explicitness.  
In looking at anti-Americanism in the Arab world, Parker (1988) argues that, above all, 
anti-Americanism is a reaction to U.S. policy, which is to a degree exacerbated by the influx of 
Western culture. Looking at the phenomenon of anti-Americanism violence and hostage taking, 
he rejects that idea that anti-Americanism is the result of some “inevitable Muslim or Arab 
animosity” (57), arguing instead that Arab anti-Americanism exists largely because of U.S. 
policy, and that despite relatively high levels of anti-Americanism, “the miracle is that relations 
with the people of [the Arab world] are not worse than they are” (55).  
Looking at anti-Americanism in Pakistan, Kizilbash (1988) also outlines an anti-
Americanism, as expressed by negative assessment of the U.S., that is reactive to the policies of 
the United States. After interviewing forty Pakistanis, He finds that anti-American attitudes have 
their roots in three policy areas of the U.S.: the perception of opposition of Pakistan’s national 
interests, support for Israel, and interference in Pakistani domestic politics. He downplays the 
importance of religious, ethnic and culturally based anti-Americanism.  
Rubinstein and Smith (1988: 36) offer four sources of anti-Americanism in the Third 
World, vaguely measured as “any hostile action or expression that becomes part and parcel of an 
undifferentiated attack on the foreign policy, society, culture, and values of the United States.” 
Sources of anti-Americanism can be issue oriented (e.g. opposition to support for Apartheid 
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South Africa), ideological (e.g. based on Marxism or Islamic fundamentalism), instrumental 
(nominal anti-Americanism mobilized by autocratic regimes, using the U.S. as a scapegoat), and 
revolutionary (popular anti-Americanism after the overthrow of a pro U.S. regimes, as in Iran 
after 1979). Though the four sources they outline are broad, they are all effects of the U.S. 
policies. They conclude that the actions of the United States can greatly lessen the phenomenon 
of anti-Americanism. Ultimately, it is policy, and policy evaluation, that matters. 
Looking at Western Europe, Smith and Wertman (1992a) who also measure anti-
Americanism by negative feelings toward the U.S., argue that anti-Americanism is a 
phenomenon that is subject to changes in U.S. policy. They observe changes in public opinion 
polls to questions about the U.S., noting how the ebb and flow coincides with various polices. 
They stress that perception of an American cultural threat does not appear to be much of an 
issue. Instead, it is the salient issue of the day that seems to guide anti-Americanism. During the 
Cold War, issues surrounding security concerns drove the phenomenon. Smith and Wertman 
posit that economic issues will drive attitudes about the U.S, which underlies what they present 
as a fundamentally reactive anti-Americanism.  
This second view of anti-Americanism de-emphasizes emotive aspects of anti-
Americanism at the expense of emphasizing its reflective, cognitive nature. Some scholars (e.g. 
Kizilbash 1988; Rubenstein and Smith 1988) note the importance of “feelings,” while 
simultaneously rejecting anti-Americanism as something as diffuse as a cultural phenomenon. At 
its root, says this literature, anti-Americanism is a reaction to, and subsequent rejection of, U.S. 
policy.  
More recent approaches to the study of anti-Americanism take slightly different 
approaches. One approach, presented by Crockatt (2003), semantically deconstructs the term 
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anti-Americanism. It constitutes a rejection of Americanism, which is itself a diverse concept 
with many meanings. Crockatt mainly focuses on cultural aspects of what constitutes 
“Americanism,” highlighting a highly subjective “idea of America” (51), which can be 
associated with American nationalism as expressed by Theodore Roosevelt, the negative 
perception of an overly technocratic society, or the emergence of the U.S. as an economic, 
political, and cultural superpower – or “Americanization.” Crockatt focuses most intently upon 
the third of these, arguing that “Separating anti-Americanism from a concern [about 
globalization and the spread of global capitalism] is thus not easy because, of all nations, the 
United States embodies modernity most completely” (57). Crockatt’s conceptualization also goes 
beyond such broad cultural phenomena, and also encompass the more obvious object of 
America’s policies and goals. Anti-Americanism is a product of both American policy practice 
and theory.  
The strength of such a view of anti-Americanism is its allowance of nuance. Crockatt 
does not treat anti-Americanism as a dichotomous concept. Rather he argues “expressions of 
anti-Americanism and pro-Americanism can exist in the same culture, indeed the same 
individual” (57). However, this view of the nature of anti-Americanism is also under-specified 
and overly broad. When looking at international politics for example, would it not be anti-
Americanism to reject both George H.W. Bush’s multilateralist “New World Order” as well as 
its seeming opposite, the “Bush Doctrine” of George W. Bush? Are the rejections of 
multilateralism empowering supranational political bodies as well as the rejections of foreign 
policy that is unilateral in nature all forms of anti-Americanism? What, then, is not anti-
Americanism?  
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A meaningful conceptualization of anti-Americanism must include the United States 
itself, and not be based merely on a broad notion of what “America” is, and a subsequent 
rejection of whatever that is. While Crockatt’s study certainly considers the contextual richness 
of anti-Americanism, focusing on intellectual give and take and cultural ebb and flow, without 
making the United States itself the center of the concept, it amounts to little more than a rejection 
of the de facto international political, cultural, and economic status quo. One cannot have anti-
Americanism without America. 
Another alternate approach in looking at anti-Americanism is to argue that it is not a 
monolithic phenomenon. An obvious shortcoming of the literature cited so far is its 
characterization of anti-Americanism as being either emotive of rational, either internal or 
external, either based on what is the U.S. is or what it does. Important advances in attempting to 
move beyond this “all or nothing” nature of the literature cited above has recently been done by 
Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, and their colleagues.  
Recent Literature on Anti-Americanism  
A forthcoming volume edited by Peter Katzenstein and Robert Keohane (2005) titled 
Anti-AmericanismS in World Politics offers a welcome change from the approaches of most of 
the previous literature. First, defining anti-Americanism as “a psychological tendency to hold 
negative views of the United States and of American society in general,” anti-Americanism is 
treated in a scientific manner, as a scientific concept (2). Second, the authors stress both internal 
and external factors, arguing against the “either-or” approach most of the previous literature 
advocates. Katzenstein and Keohane argue in favor of a nuanced anti-Americanism, with various 
dimensions based on different origins. In fact, they argue that instead of a single type of anti-
Americanism, there are actually various forms of anti-Americanism that deserve to be 
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conceptually separated into “anti-Americanisms.” They stress six types of anti-Americanism 
worthy of study.  
The first of these types is liberal anti-Americanism, which is based on criticism that the 
United States does not live up to the ideals it claims to represent. Those demonstrating liberal 
anti-Americanism are most concerned with what they perceive as the hypocrisy of the U.S. 
claiming to champion freedom, human rights and democracy while supporting unattractive, 
dictatorial, and/or corrupt regimes. Liberal anti-Americanism is traditionally exhibited in the 
developed world, and among western-educated elites in the third world.  
The second type is social anti-Americanism. In this type of anti-Americanism, the 
perception of injustice inherent in “the American system” is espoused. An economic system 
espousing free markets and (relatively) unconstrained capitalism is central. It is often argued that 
“American-style capitalism” favors the rich and powerful at the expense of the poor and the 
weak. Other criticism reflects concern over the use of the death penalty, the lack of broad social 
safety nets, and the use of unilateralism over multilateralism in the international arena. While 
social anti-Americans may find some basic agreements on some core aspects of U.S. ideals (the 
importance of freedom, democracy and human rights, for example), and thus hypocrisy may play 
a factor, social anti-Americanism is based on some inherent disagreements with America and 
what it stands for.  
A third form of anti-Americanism is sovereign-nationalist. This type is based on political 
concerns, specifically maintaining the political power of one’s country, where the U.S. is seen as 
a rival, and the importance of national identity, which the U.S. might threaten, which can be 
especially salient when one views oneself as part of a hard fought movement for liberation (as in 
much of the third world), or as part of a great power or potential great power that deserves its 
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place of importance on the international stage – a place that the U.S. with all its power might 
threaten (as in Russia or China).  
The fourth type of anti-Americanism outlined by Katzenstein and Keohane is radical. 
This form stresses a belief system that holds that the United States, and its entire economic, 
political and cultural system are morally corrupt, and with the U.S. system being so prominent 
and influential in global politics, it must be fundamentally changed either from within or without. 
This form of anti-Americanism has traditionally most closely associated with Marxist-Leninism, 
which associates the United States with inherently regressive forces contrary to the forces of 
natural human progress and enlightenment (scientific socialism) that will result in a global 
society with no class conflicts. More recently Jihadist Islamicism has taken up the banner of 
radical anti-Americanism, based on the notion that United States is the manifestation of in an 
inherently corrupt system that celebrates the decadent, and has openly and audaciously 
renounced the path of moral truth and righteousness.  
The fifth type, elitist anti-Americanism, is based on notions of cultural and national 
superiority. The United States is seen as inherently inferior, based on subjective (and biased) 
aesthetic and normative evaluations, which includes disparaging existential characteristics of 
things “American” as of inherently inferior quality, such as American food, wine, climate, music, 
art, and its supposedly base, unsophisticated religiosity. This type of anti-Americanism is 
especially observable in France, particularly among elites.  
The sixth type in Katzenstein and Keohane’s typology is legacy anti-Americanism. This 
occurs when the U.S. is thought to have wronged a particular society in the past, which leads to 
the institutionalization of anti-American ideas. Prime examples are in Mexico, caused by the 
perception of unjustified military aggression and imperialistic policies, Spain and Greece, where 
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the U.S. supported past dictatorial regimes, and Iran, where there is the perception of various acts 
of American interference in domestic politics.  
By parsing out various types of anti-Americanism by their respective sources, 
Katzenstein and Keohane and make an important advance in the literature on anti-Americanism. 
First, and most obviously, they do not stress either internal or external sources as a main source, 
but argue that both are important, and often overlap in fostering anti-American attitudes. Second, 
they stress the importance of cognitions and emotions both implicitly in their framework of 
multiple anti-Americanisms, and more explicitly when discussing the specific role emotions have 
regarding each type of anti-Americanism. They argue that emotions play the role of determining 
strength of an anti-Americanism, though different negative emotions play different roles in 
determining this strength, based on the type of anti-Americanism. They do not, in other words, 
reduce anti-Americanism to being either fundamentally cognitive or emotional in nature, as the 
previous literature on anti-Americanism largely did.  
Katzenstein and Keohane do cite the importance of psychological processes in putting 
forth a continuum of anti-Americanism, which includes opinions, distrust, and bias. Expressions 
of anti-American opinions, readily observed in public opinion polls, demonstrates what they 
propose is a superficial expression of anti-Americanism, one that may or may not demonstrate 
deeper animosity toward the U.S.  One who holds anti-American opinions is not necessarily 
predisposed to have a negative view of the United States. Distrust and bias, which constitutes 
forms of predisposition against the U.S., they argue, “should be of serious concern to policy-
makers, particularly if these negative predispositions become deeply entrenched in societies that 
are important to the United States” (12). Those who demonstrate distrust are more likely to hold 
negative views of the U.S. and be naturally disposed to be suspicious of its policies. When anti-
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Americanism reaches the stage of bias, the person demonstrating this bias loses practically all 
ability to objectively analyze American policy or anything related to it. It will not be seen on its 
merits, but universally judged to be negative regardless of its characteristics or circumstances. 
Information regarding the U.S. is processed in a fundamentally different, universally negative, 
way.  
Several scholars, in collaboration with Katzenstein and Keohane, use their psychological 
typology and the various types of anti-Americanisms as a basis for analyzing the subject. Lynch 
(2005) argues that Arab anti-Americanism does not yet reach the level of “bias,” in that it is still 
responsive to new information and can and does fluctuate based on perceptions of United States 
policy. Instead anti-Americanism in the Arab world is characterized by extreme levels of 
distrust. Using survey data from across five regions of the world, Chiozza (2005a) comes to a 
similar conclusion, arguing that systemic negative evaluations of the U.S. (leaning towards bias) 
are the exception rather than the norm. In looking at France, Meunier (2005) asserts a similar 
point, that French anti-Americanism, while occasionally bordering on bias, is still largely 
malleable, and largely contingent on American policy.  
Katzenstein and Keohane (2005: 3) do not offer a complex psychological explanation of 
how anti-Americanism is conceptualized, as they explicitly state “[w]e focus on the politics of 
anti-Americanism rather than seeking empirically to disentangle its socio-psychological 
components” (3). They recognize, despite their focus on more social structural aspects of anti-
Americanism, the importance psychology plays in determining anti-Americanism, but their goal 
is to study anti-Americanism emphasizing the political, which is important in stressing what they 
argue is a nuanced and complex set of beliefs, based on various social structural contexts.  
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Other important work in this regard has been done by Giacomo Chiozza (2005b). In a 
comparative analysis of anti-Americanism in both Islamic and European states, Chiozza seprates 
anti-Americanism into two distinct strands – rejections of U.S. policy, and rejections of its polity. 
He shows how views of U.S. foreign policy constrain views of how people think about American 
society and culture, with a respondent’s positive views of U.S. policy limiting the degree to 
which one is critical of U.S. polity or culture. However, negative views of U.S. policy do not 
necessarily reflect negative evaluation of culture and polity. He interprets this to mean people are 
conducting separate evaluations of the U.S., and that despite broad disagreements with the U.S. 
in the Muslim world and in Europe, “America as a cultural and political symbol attracts more 
than it repels” (30). That is that what people think about what America does can and does differ 
greatly from what people feel America is. Like Katzenstein and Keohane, he accepts a 
distinction between the cognitive and the emotive.  
Direction of the Project 
The main body of research on anti-Americanism all has the underlying theme: that anti-
Americanism can be primarily explained by a monolithic causal factor. The research of 
Katzenstein and Keohane (2005) and their colleagues offers a welcome exception to this 
approach by pointing out multiple causal factors, but also argues in favor of separating negative 
evaluations of what the U.S. is and what it does. All of this deviates from the first extensive work 
in the social science literature on anti-Americanism by Tai, Peterson and Gurr (1973), which 
unfortunately, the entire body of subsequent anti-Americanism literature has missed. In this 
unfortunately obscure piece, they argue that anti-Americanism is a coherent, unified 
phenomenon that has multiple causes that are both internal and external in nature, and 
demonstrate this by observing both internal political and socio-economic conditions and external 
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policy of the U.S. as measured by U.S. presence, using both to predict anti-American 
demonstrations and acts of anti-American violence. In short, both internal and external factors 
matter – anti-Americanism is neither solely a function of internal factors within a country, nor is 
it completely dependent on U.S. policy.  
While Tai, Peterson and Gurr do not address a cognitive-emotive distinction like the 
more recent literature on anti-Americanism, their research has important implications in this 
regard. As the literature cited above has argued, anti-American evaluations that are rooted in 
negative evaluations of what the U.S. “is” are generally referred to as internal and emotive in 
nature, whereas anti-American evaluations rooted in U.S. policy are generally referred to as 
external, and primarily “cognitive” in nature. Insofar as internal sources of anti-Americanism can 
be described as “emotive” and external ones can be described as “rational,” as the bulk of anti-
Americanism literature suggests, this implies either anti-Americanism is one and not the other, or 
that there are different “types” of anti-Americanism that can and should be conceptually 
separated. Tai, Peterson and Gurr do not take this approach, but look at anti-Americanism as a 
single, coherent phenomenon with multiple sources.  
Following Tai, Peterson and Gurr (1973), we argue against a mono-causal anti-
Americanism having its roots completely in internal political and socio-economic conditions, or 
one that is completely dependent on U.S. policy. In following them we also argue in favor of an 
anti-Americanism existing independently of a theoretically tenuous emotive-cognitive 
distinction. Using psychological theory rather than theories of mass sociology, we will attempt to 
extend their argument. We will argue that anti-Americanism is neither a fundamentally and 
exclusively emotive or cognitive phenomenon, as the first two strains of literature discussed 
above suggest. What is needed is to measure a phenomenon that focuses on the United States 
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itself, while not making artificial distinctions on the “nature” of the evaluation, be it primarily 
emotive or cognitive, internally or externally based. Indeed, we propose that anti-Americanism is 
both emotional and cognitive, and that these adjectives are not only empirically 
indistinguishable, but theoretically indistinguishable as well, an argument we make in the next 
chapter. 
Proposed Scope and Organization of the Project 
This dissertation focuses on Europe, primarily Western Europe, for several reasons: First, 
there is the substantive importance of the Transatlantic alliance and the implications anti-
Americanism has on this. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been the most 
viable military alliance in the world for over five decades. Whether it will continue to be a salient 
institution is largely contingent on U.S.-European relations. With the countries of Europe being 
representative democracies, the implications for the effects of anti-Americanism on NATO are 
obvious, especially insofar as European integration creates a viable alternative military alliance 
independent of the Transatlantic ties. Second, a project on a topic of this scope needs boundaries. 
Confining this project to Europe, primarily Western Europe, offers logical boundaries that are 
still broad enough to offer meaningful and hopefully generalizable findings. Finally, more public 
opinion polls have been done in Western European countries about the United States than 
anywhere else. Looking at Europe offers the widest range of data and thus the greatest 
applicability of quantitative analysis. Despite the limited scope of this project, the intention is not 
to develop and test theories of anti-Americanism that apply only to Europe. This project is 
intended to be a substantive study of anti-Americanism. By incorporating cognitive 
psychological theory into public opinion research, this project will also represent a theoretical 
advance with implications other than application to just the study of anti-Americanism.   
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The second chapter will outline a theory of conceptualizing anti-Americanism, using 
advances in social and cognitive psychological theory. We argue that one cannot fundamentally 
distinguish between the cognitive and the emotive. Using survey data from various sources we 
demonstrate reactions to U.S. policy and feelings about the United States do not separate 
concepts. Instead, attitudes about U.S. policy represent a single measure of subjective constraint 
(or lack of constraint) to criticize the United States. We also show the high consistency of 
attitudes U.S. across issues, arguing the consistency of these attitudes represents cognitive 
processes of dissonance reduction. These processes are further affected by issue salience, as 
more salient aspects of the United States drive attitudes on less salient dimensions. We argue 
that, rather than there being various anti-Americanisms, as argued by Katzenstein and Keohane 
and their colleagues, that anti-Americanism is a singular phenomenon.  
The third chapter will answer the important question, “why does anti-Americanism 
matter?” What important effects does anti-Americanism have? Chapter 3 discusses the effects of 
anti-Americanism on the perception of the United States as a meaningful international actor, and 
also discuss the effects of anti-Americanism on support for important international institutions 
such as NATO, the United Nations, the IMF, the WTO, the World Bank, and European Union. 
We also explore the degree to which anti-Americanism might direct the decreased support for 
NATO in the direction of a European foreign and security policy that excludes the United States. 
Because the countries of Europe are democracies, anti-American public opinion in those 
countries could lead to a greater tendency on the part of European leaders to keep the United 
States at arm’s length. 
Chapter 4 looks at important sources of anti-Americanism. It demonstrates that security 
concerns and political ideology are important sources for anti-Americanism, but that the effects 
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of these attitudes are largely shaped by political and historical contexts. Chapter 4 also 
demonstrates that general dispositions about U.S. policy do much to shape anti-Americanism. 
While both contextual attitudes and general attitudes about the world are important, general 
policy positions about the world do more to drive anti-Americanism than do attitudes contingent 
on historical and political contexts.  
The fifth chapter presents a case study of the events surrounding the invasion of Iraq by 
the United States and its allies. Anti-Americanism has reached a new threshold since the 
invasion, which is the result of a series of specific conditions. Invading Iraq against the will of 
the greater international community was an event unparalleled in the history of the U.S. in its 
level of global unpopularity and condemnation, and triggered a new level of anti-American 
sentiment. The opinions of the more politically engaged “opinion leaders” demonstrate a 
growing trend of anti-Americanism in late 2002, months before the invasion of Iraq. The 
solidification of a new level of anti-Americanism in Western Europe is evidenced by greater 
anti-American attitudes across all levels of education, income, political ideology, gender, and 
political engagement.  
The concluding chapter summarizes the results and implications of this study. Despite 
being a public opinion phenomenon, one based on perception and subjective evaluation, it is still 
clearly related to U.S. policy and engagement. U.S. policy does not, indeed it cannot, end anti-
Americanism. Someone will always demonstrate negative opinions and dislike for the U.S. no 
matter its policy. The U.S. can, however, limit the scope of anti-Americanism through policy, 
diplomacy, and fostering the perception of American willingness to engage in the international 
community.  
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CHAPTER 2: A THEORY ON THE NATURE OF ANTI-AMERICANISM 
Conceptualizing Anti-Americanism 
As outlined in the previous chapter, much of the debate regarding anti-Americanism 
revolves around what constitutes the “core” of the concept. Is it a fundamentally vitriolic 
phenomenon, based on emotional resentment, something akin to bigotry? Or is it a rational 
process based on objective evaluation? Perhaps it is both. One does not necessarily preclude the 
other. Can one not both dislike what the United States is, and what is does? To what degree can 
evaluations of what the U.S. is and what it does be separated? Is the mass public capable of 
discerning between the evaluation of the behavior of the object and the object itself?  
We define anti-Americanism as “a systematic negative normative evaluation of the 
United States.” This definition does not preclude either anti-American prejudice, or nuanced 
evaluation reflecting measured policy disagreements. It encompasses both. A general theme of 
one strain of literature on anti-Americanism as outlined in the previous chapter (with the notable 
exception of Fabrinni 2002) is that anti-Americanism is the result of moral and spiritual 
shortcomings of those who exhibit it. This approach is not only unscientific, but politically 
motivated. The second strain of literature examined in Chapter 1 emphasizes an anti-
Americanism that reflects U.S. policy and is therefore based wholly on rational thought and 
reasoned discourse (even where education and literacy is low).1 This exclusive focus on 
rationality should be rejected. Just because anti-Americanism is a reflective phenomenon that is 
both logical and explainable, does not mean it reflects a view that is devoid of irrational 
sentiment and is entirely the product of well reasoned and objective policy evaluations. Anti-
                                                 
1 To be fair, this argument also has the potential for political motivation. While those on the right in the United 
States will be willing to champion the first strain of the literature as offering the best explanation of anti-
Americanism, those on the left would probably support the second strain, as it largely argues that anti-Americanism 
is a reaction to policies with which they disagree.  
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Americanism is above all an opinion. The expression of such opinion is therefore subject to the 
same mechanisms of opinion formation as other opinions, and opinion formation is not always a 
fundamentally rational process, though one that is still theoretically explainable (Zaller 1992; 
Zaller and Feldman 1992). Anti-Americanism certainly has emotional aspects, as does anything 
people can have strong opinions about. Similarly, anti-Americanism is certainly also cognitive to 
a large degree, as is any belief people consciously embrace.  So it is with anti-Americanism.   
On the Cognitive and the Emotive – a False Dichotomy 
Much of public opinion research has focused on the idea of support – support for objects 
as tangible as candidates or government policies, for more encompassing objects such as 
governments and regimes, for more abstract objects such as one’s nation, the ideal of democracy, 
or the concept of “liberty.” Intuitively, distinguishing between such levels of abstraction is 
highly appealing. A traditional distinction in public opinion research, particularly in comparative 
politics, distinguishes between “types” of support based on the level of abstraction of the object. 
The work of Easton (1965, 1975) has been most influential in this regard. Easton distinguishes 
between what he calls alternately “specific” or “instrumental” support, and “affective” or 
“diffuse” support. In supporting a political system, citizens have initial orientations toward the 
system that are based upon rational, reasoned and well-considered evaluations on the objective 
value of the system. Over time, this detached evaluation leads to more abstract support, in which 
the citizens not only supports the results of the system itself, but the ideals on which they 
perceive the system is based. Over time, citizens support not only the specific institutions (“the 
government,” a political party, or a particular bureaucracy), but also the ideals they are 
supposedly based on (democracy, liberty, “the nation”). The basic premise is both intuitively 
appealing and parsimonious, and has proven to be an extremely influential theory in how 
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comparative political scientists look at public opinion, explaining a wide range of phenomena 
from why citizens who ostensibly oppose their government’s policies do not pose a threat to 
democratic governance (Norris 1999), to the nature of support for European integration (Gabel 
1998). This framework, commonly known as the “Eastonian Model,” is predicated upon the idea 
that orientations toward an object can differ qualitatively. One can both dislike policy of a 
regime, but like the ideals upon which that regime is founded, with the former representing 
objective, reasoned, “cognitive” analyses, the latter representing gut-level, emotive orientations.  
That Easton is never mentioned in the studies of anti-Americanism is not surprising. His 
model covers support, while anti-Americanism is about opposition. However, the literature 
seems largely to fall along the same intuitive lines of Easton’s cognitive-emotive distinction, not 
only in the respective traditions of literature discussed above, but most recently in the work of 
Chiozza (2005b), who one could argue, outlines “specific” and “diffuse” types of anti-
Americanism.2  
Theoretical Basis for Merging the Emotive and the Cognitive 
Despite dominance of the Eastonian tradition in comparative political science, a growing 
literature within political psychology and political behavior recognizes that cognitive processes 
cannot be separated from emotive ones (Rahn 2000; Lodge and Taber 2000; McDermott 2004). 
This notion is predicated on theories of emotional appraisal, based on a large body of work in the 
field of cognitive psychology (Ortony, Clore and Collins 1988; Lazarus 1991a, 1991b, 2001; 
Roseman and Smith 2001; Roseman 2001; Scherer 2001; Smith and Lazarus 1990; Smith and 
Kirby 2001; for a review of the emotional appraisal literature see Schorr 2001). Emotional 
                                                 
2 Insofar as Chiozza appears to make a specific-diffuse distinction, he seems to do so intuitively. He never refers to 
the specific-diffuse distinction, and does he cite Easton in his work. However, the intuitive logic of the Eastonian 
model presents itself, as Chiozza notes “the disapproval of America’s policies does not have the psychological force 
to displace the aspirations that American symbolizes” (2005b, 30) 
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appraisal theory argues that emotions are based upon valence cognitive evaluations from which 
they cannot be separated. In noting the problems with attempting to separate cognitions and 
emotions, Lazarus (1991a: 179) writes: 
One difficulty with a solution that makes cognition separate from emotion is that 
emotion and cognition are each so complex, and their mechanisms spread so widely 
over the central and peripheral neural pathways that, in my opinion, it is difficult to 
argue convincingly for separate systems as though there were a special brain organ 
for each.  
 
The notion that emotions and cognitions are inextricably linked is currently the dominant 
paradigm within cognitive psychology (Dalgleish and Power 1999), and it this notion has gained 
acceptance in other disciplines such as moral philosophy (Nussbaum 2001) and political science 
(McDermott 2004). In embracing this theoretical perspective of emotional appraisal, it is 
important to define “emotion.” Ortony, Clore and Collins (1988: 13), define emotions as 
“valenced reaction to events, agents, or objects based on perceptions about the world.” Individual 
emotions are varied reactions that that exist independently of each other, and are “based on the 
nature of their cognitive origins” (13). Therefore, emotions themselves are phenomena of 
cognitive origin, based on an initial cognitive evaluation that assigns valence, with different 
emotional states resulting from different cognitive paths.  
Additionally, the emotional appraisal literature addresses the cognitive origin of 
emotional intensity. Ortony, Clore and Collins (1988: Chapter 4) outline four characteristics of 
cognitive origin that affect the intensity of an emotion: 1) a sense of reality of an emotion-
inducing situation, 2) proximity in the form of psychological closeness to the emotion inducing 
situation, 3) unexpectedness of a situation, and 4) prior arousal to a situation. Scherer (2001) 
posits that emotional intensity has its roots in a set of cognition-based evaluations: relevance, 
implications, coping potential, and normative significance. This means that not only the origins, 
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but also the strength of emotions inextricably linked to cognition (see also Smith and Kirby 
2001).  
Finally, emotional appraisal theory argues that an important function of emotion is 
cognitive in nature (Smith and Lazarus 1990; Ortony, Clore and Collins 1988: Chapter 9; Scherr 
2001). Smith and Lazarus (1990) assert that the origins of emotional responses came about in 
complex organisms in order to cope with complex problems inherent in their environment. They 
are not, in other words, random response states. Instead they serve a purpose fundamentally 
attached to cognitive appraisal. Emotions shape how we think about the world. In exploring how 
emotion plays a role in the concept of rationality as used in political science, McDermott (2004) 
comes to a similar conclusion. Basing her argument on a thorough review of the relevant 
neuroscience literature, she argues not only that emotions are not separate from rational thought 
processes, but are essential to their proper functioning. That is, in order to make proper rational 
judgments, emotions are not only integral, but also necessary. “[E]motion is part of rationality 
itself, and… the two are intimately intertwined and interconnected processes, psychologically 
and neurologically. From this perspective, emotion remains endogenous to rationality itself” 
(McDermott 2004, 693).  
As such, anti-Americanism is certainly emotional to some extent, but not in the way 
many of those who decry “emotional” anti-Americanism advocate. When the concept of an 
emotion has been actually defined, the source of its intensity discussed, and its function 
addressed, the mystery has been taken out of what an emotional anti-Americanism encompasses 
and the semantic smoke and mirrors of much of the literature on “emotional” anti-Americanism 
is betrayed for what it is: meaningless rhetoric with no scientific basis. When bases and strength 
of emotions are based upon cognitive evaluations rather than some quasi-mystical explanation 
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based on inherent moral shortcomings, then we can begin to look at anti-Americanism as an 
explainable phenomenon rather than some inexplicable pathological state.   
Moving Beyond the Cognitive-Emotional Dichotomy 
The points outlined above are obviously at odds with much of the literature on anti-
Americanism, which takes the highly intuitive but theoretically dubious route of separating 
“visceral” and “rational” anti-Americanism. Some scholars (e.g. Haseler 1985) would even argue 
that only negative evaluations that are emotional in nature would constitute anti-Americanism, 
while thought out, cognitive, “rational” disagreement with U.S. policy is not anti-Americanism at 
all. This view fails to recognize that emotions are themselves predicated upon cognitive 
evaluations. Others scholars (e.g. Kizilbash 1988) would argue that such “visceral” reactions to 
the U.S. are the exception, not the norm. Attitudes about the United States are predicated upon 
reasoned and well thought-out processes involving specific policy disagreements, and are 
therefore not reflective of any sort of strong emotional response at all. Again, this invokes a false 
dichotomy between emotion and cognition.  
Anti-Americanism is neither exclusively rational (cognitive) nor emotive. It is both. To 
argue otherwise is to delve into dangerous theoretical and empirical waters. Emotion does not 
preclude cognition, and since emotions cannot be fundamentally separated from the cognitive 
root of the valence evaluations that give rise to them, they may be theoretically as well as 
empirically indistinguishable. Evaluations of an object do not represent exclusively emotive or 
cognitive responses to that object (Ortony, Clore and Collins 1988; McDermott 2004). They 
represent both. As such, one cannot separate evaluations of an object into categories that are 
arbitrarily emotive or cognitive.  
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Separating the rational from the emotive is not only problematic for the theoretical 
reasons, but also for empirical reasons.  Inherent limitations of the survey instrument constrain 
our ability to determine the precise motivation behind providing a given response. Let us say that 
a survey were to ask about general feeling for the American people, something that many would 
argue constitutes an emotional anti-Americanism. How could we conclude that a European 
survey respondent could not have a negative opinion of the American people based on a 
reasoned analysis of Americans’ inability to stop what the respondent perceives as bad U.S. 
policy? Certainly, such a question would capture emotional antipathy one has toward Americans 
as amoral, and uncaring about the rest of the world, as well as reasoned evaluations based on 
careful analysis. The United States is, after all, a democratic government. If the American people 
allow what the respondent construes to be imperialism that destabilizes world order through the 
re-election of President Bush and a sympathetic Congress, then such reasoned, rational analysis 
ultimately results in a negative opinion of the American people. What many would intuit to be 
fundamentally “emotional” anti-Americanism could, in fact, turn out to be based almost entirely 
on reasoned, logical analysis.  
In any event, it is highly unlikely that such evaluations are not predicated on policy 
analyses of the United States. Likewise one should not be likely to express a fondness for U.S. 
policy, while expressing a negative view of the American people. Again, the relationship 
between these different items is certainly not perfect, but should still be theoretically explainable 
and empirically resolvable within a framework emphasizing anti-Americanism as a mostly 
uniform phenomena, with valence evaluations of the objects overriding nuanced evaluations of 
the characteristic of that object (a notion that will be explained in more detail below). While 
evaluations of American policy and Americans themselves may appear to be different, the theory 
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presented suggests this not be interpreted as meaning respondents are evaluating policy and 
representing feelings separately from each other. Instead, respondents evaluate an object with an 
awareness that some opinions are more socially acceptable than others (Berinsky 1999).3   
What do different negative evaluations of the U.S., based on different levels of social 
acceptability, mean, and how do they relate to a mostly uniform anti-Americanism? One useful 
distinction had been recently made by Joseph Nye (2002; 2004), who outlines the difference 
between hard and soft power. Hard power refers to the traditional international mechanisms of 
using various economic or military incentives or reprisals in order to accomplish one’s goals. 
Soft power is using the power of persuasion rather than coercion to accomplish these goals. 
Examples of soft power include cultural characteristics such as music or television, commercial 
brands, and perceived values such as liberty, democracy, and technological achievement. Nye 
points out that, on the international scale, the withering away of soft power can result from the 
perceived misuse of hard power. On an individual level, those rejecting U.S. soft power are most 
likely to have objections based on application of hard power.  
This theoretical distinction, while not a perfect representation of how mass publics view 
world politics, indicates important reference points that respondents will intuitively grasp. 
Respondents understand that criticism of some (“soft”) objects, such as American culture in 
general, represents a stronger denunciation of the U.S. that criticism of other (“hard”) objects, 
such as U.S. policy regarding treatment of prisoners detained in the “war on terror.” 
The theory presented does not argue that mass publics distinguish between different 
aspects of the same object based strictly on Nye’s distinction. Instead, Nye’s theoretical 
                                                 
3 Social acceptability theory is relevant here insofar as one accepts that it is more publicly acceptable to show 
disapproval of or negativity toward American policy than Americans themselves. As previously noted in chapter 
one, anti-Americanism is in common parlance known to be a pejorative, and respondents should have a tendency not 
to want to appear anti-American, even on a survey.  
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distinction is something that respondents grasp loosely and intuitively, and does not denote 
discernment between different objects. Objections to hard and soft power of the U.S. both 
constitute anti-Americanism, but to different degrees. Mass publics ahould make some 
distinctions based on “hard” and “soft” aspect of the United States, but not based on nuanced, 
fundamentally multi-dimensional evaluations of the object in question. There are not, in other 
words, different types of anti-Americanism, as argued in the recent literature by Katzenstein, 
Keohane, and colleagues. Instead these seeming separate evaluations actually represent different 
degrees of antipathy toward the same object, and different levels of willingness to criticize that 
object. The argument here is based partially on Zaller’s (1992) assertion that responses to survey 
items (or opinions) do not represent “true” attitudes, but can mean different things depending on 
how the question was framed, the context of question in relation to other questions, or the 
salience of the issue, among other factors.  
Simply put, some criticisms of the United States are more socially and personally 
acceptable than others. Many pundits and intellectuals make a point to argue that most criticism 
of the U.S. is largely based on those factors Nye associates with hard power, particularly U.S. 
foreign military policy, the hardest of the various forms of hard power. Those things associated 
with the soft power of the U.S., its culture, people, and democratic values, are generally said to 
be seen in a more positive light. According to the theory, then, the respondent understands that 
some “hard” criticism of the U.S. (e.g., criticism of the foreign policy of the Bush 
administration) is less critical and less extreme than other forms of “soft” criticism (e.g., 
expressing a dislike for the American people).  
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We isolate two forms of anti-American expression: political expressions and existential 
expressions.4 This distinction parallels the types of power expressed by Nye.  Political 
expressions of anti-Americanism relate primarily to U.S. policy in foreign relations and 
economics. Existential expressions of anti-Americanism relate primarily to core attributes of the 
U.S., such as Americans themselves, or aspects of its culture or society. Political expressions 
constitute “easier” expressions of anti-Americanism, based on seemingly more “legitimate” 
concerns that seem to reflect “reasonable” positions rather than extreme ones. Conversely, 
existential expressions denote “harder” expressions of anti-Americanism, where a respondent 
feels less constrained to criticize the U.S. and is willing to make more “extreme” negative 
evaluations. The distinctions between political and existential expressions of anti-Americanism 
is consistent with the notion in the cognitive psychology literature that argues emotional 
responses have their bases in cognitive appraisals. More extreme negative evaluations of the 
United States, namely those characterized as “existential” expressions of anti-Americanism, 
represent on average higher overall levels of emotional content (though certainly not void of 
cognitive appraisal) than “political expressions,” which represent something closer to detached, 
rational appraisal (though not without some emotional content). One should precede the other. 
Political expressions anti-Americanism should come before existential ones.  
It is important to emphasize that these representations are merely different forms of 
expressing anti-Americanism. The first form, political expressions of anti-Americanism, as well 
as representing initial levels of anti-Americanism, will also represent a degree of subjective 
constraint of willingness to demonstrate existential expressions of anti-Americanism. This 
                                                 
4 We make this distinction in expressions of anti-Americanism in order to establish political and existential anti-
Americanism 1) are interrelated and 2) how they are interrelated. It is important to point out that they do not denote 
different types of anti-Americanism, but rather different ways of expressing anti-Americanism. We use the terms 
“political” and “existential” as the terms “hard expressions” and “soft expressions” of anti-Americanism would be 
counterintuitive.  
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suggests that a response to a survey item regarding political expressions of anti-Americanism 
does not strictly represent “true” attitudes in the tradition of the Michigan school of public 
opinion (Zaller 1992). High measures on the political expressions of anti-Americanism will be a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for high measures on the existential expressions of anti-
Americanism. As a respondent becomes more willing to criticize U.S. policy, he or she should be 
more willing to demonstrate existential expressions of anti-Americanism, with the political 
expressions of anti-Americanism acting as a precondition. Again, one does not express 
enthusiastic approval of U.S. policy, followed by saying “death to America.” While there should 
be a strong positive relationship between political and existential expressions of anti-
Americanism, such a relationship should show a high degree of error at the higher levels of 
negative policy evaluation.  
The Predominant Uniformity of Anti-Americanism 
A major theme in the discussion of the theory so far has been the idea that anti-
Americanism, rather than being a multi-faceted and multi-dimensional concept, is predominantly 
uniform in nature. If we are to make this argument more explicitly, a deeper discussion of some 
aspects of this theory is necessary to tie up some theoretical loose ends.  
Semantically, the term “anti-Americanism” implies a negative valence. While this is a 
necessary label, it can be misleading about the nature of the phenomenon. Two core attributes of 
the theory presented here are 1) expressions of anti-Americanism differ in degree, not in kind, 
and 2) anti-Americanism in not dichotomous in nature – one is not either “anti-American” or not. 
As such, anti-Americanism cannot be given an arbitrary starting point. Aside from a person who 
would never criticize the United States on anything, for any reason, everyone is, to some degree, 
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anti-American.5 According to the theory presented, the only thing separating anti-Americanism 
from pro-Americanism is valence. They are not fundamentally different.  
This semantic point being addressed, it is now possible to explicitly address anti-
Americanism as is a predominantly uniform concept. According to the theory presented in this 
chapter, different ways of measuring anti-Americanism should not yield systematically 
dissimilar association when compared. Simply put, if we are to observe different measurements 
of anti-Americanism over the same unit of analysis (be it a national state or an individual survey 
respondent at the same point in time), we would expect a strong degree of association, as these 
measures, though attained differently, are measuring the same concept. 
We can now present two hypotheses concerning the reliability of anti-Americanism as a 
measure demonstrating uniformity.  
Hypothesis one: Anti-Americanism, as something that differs in its expressions 
quantitatively but not qualitatively, should show vast similarities when being compared 
using different forms of measurement over comparable units of aggregation. 
Hypothesis two: To the degree that there is incongruence in the positive associations 
between different measures of anti-Americanism, such congruence should show a 
specific pattern. Political expressions of anti-Americanism will serve as a precursor to 
existential expressions of anti-Americanism. A respondent may be high on both 
measures, low on both measures, or high on political expressions and simultaneously low 
on existential ones. However, a respondent will tend not to be low on political 
expressions while high on existential ones. 
                                                 
5 This includes, of course, citizens of the United States. There is no logical reason they should be exempt from 
demonstrating anti-Americanism.  
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Heuristics, Cognitive Consistency, and Anti-Americanism  
While addressing what anti-Americanism is, the theory does not address how it is initially 
formed and shaped by subjective interpretation of events and factors related to the object in 
question (the United States). One has a valenced reaction, but to what? We have looked at how 
cognitive and emotional evaluations go together, but not at how they come about, or the 
mechanisms by which the initial (cognitive) appraisals are shaped. So far in the theory of the 
nature of anti-Americanism, we know what it is, but not so much why it exists, or how it is 
structured.  
A major theme in research into the psychology of pubic opinion has been that individuals 
use mental shortcuts, or heuristics, to process information about the political world (Kuklinski 
and Quirk 2000; Taber 2003).  Much prominent research in public opinion demonstrates this (see 
e.g. Campbell et al 1960; Converse 1964; Popkin 1991). Research by Hurwitz and Peffley (1987; 
1990; 1993) have specifically applied this idea to attitudes about foreign policy in their 
hierarchical model of foreign policy evaluation, utilizing values such as nationalism, or past 
perceptions of a rival countries. A similar process occurs with evaluating the policy of the United 
States. However, in the process of using such heuristics, one must also consider the importance 
of temporal shifts in opinion, suggesting that past perceptions constrain current opinion only so 
much (Peffley and Hurwitz 1992). The importance of current issue salience must be taken into 
account (Zaller 1992). This is consistent with the notion that heuristics are key in determining 
opinion – evaluation of an object’s most salient attribute should drive evaluations on other 
attribute. 
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Classic social psychological theory suggests evaluations of an object should tend toward 
cognitive consistency.6 This process should result in a set of normative views about an object 
that are consistently of the same valence. Festinger (1957: 3) argues in his seminal work, A 
Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, that having inconsistent, or dissonant, attitudes about an object 
is psychologically uncomfortable, and “will motivate the person to try to reduce dissonance and 
achieve consonance (consistency).” Heider (1958) similarly argued that inconsistency, or 
imbalance, should be similarly resolved by an individual, who will strive for the comfort of 
cognitive consistency (balance). Such notions are hardly antiquated, and continue to provide for 
useful applications not only in social psychology (Harmon-Jones and Mills 1999), but political 
science (Visser 1994; Ray 1999). Furthermore, notions of cognitive consistency, while not 
explicitly cited as such, are highly compatible with Zaller’s (1992) axioms of the survey 
response.  
Anti-American attitudes should follow this pattern of cognitive consistency. Negative 
evaluations of the U.S. on some issues should drive subsequent negative evaluations on others, 
resulting in a systematic negative bias that reflects a process of dissonance reduction.  
Hypothesis three: evaluations of various policy attributes of the U.S. will tend not to be 
considered separately. Instead, they will reflect a pattern where respondents give answers 
of a consistent valence, reflecting a tendency to strive for cognitive consistency and avoid 
cognitive dissonance.  
While negative evaluations should go together of their own accord, they should be 
affected more by salient aspects of the object. Evaluation of the United States on the most salient 
issue should act as a heuristic by which respondents evaluate the U.S. on other, less salient 
                                                 
6 This occurs in the stage of one making sense of the world (i.e. cognitive appraisal). As such, it precedes emotive 
expressions. 
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issues. This idea is consistent both with theories of opinion formation (Zaller 1992; Zaller and 
Feldman 1992) and social psychological theories of object evaluation (Festinger 1957, see esp. 
46; Heider 1958; Newcomb 1961). The effect of change then, if it were salient enough, should 
go on to affect overall perception (Peffley and Huwitz 1992).  
Hypothesis four: Overall evaluations of the United States, while being guided by overall 
tendencies toward cognitive consistency, should also be guided by evaluations on more 
salient characteristics.  
Testing the Theory: The Reliability Hypotheses 
This theory on the nature of anti-Americanism, must now be tested. To test hypothesis 
one (anti-Americanism, as something that differs in its expressions quantitatively but not 
qualitatively, should show vast similarities when being compared using different forms of 
measurement over comparable units of aggregation) and hypothesis two (to the degree that there 
is incongruence in the positive associations between different measures of anti-Americanism, 
such congruence should show a specific pattern. Political expressions of anti-Americanism will 
serve as a precursor to existential expressions of anti-Americanism. A respondent may be high 
on both measures, low on both measures, or high on political expressions and simultaneously 
low on existential ones. However, a respondent will tend not to be low on political expressions 
while high on existential ones) we need to specify different measures of anti-Americanism and 
compare them. We use two data sources to test these arguments. The German Marshall Fund of 
the United States (2002) did a survey in six European countries (France, Germany, Great Britain, 
Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland) in the summer of 2002. The Pew Global Attitudes Project 
(2003) also conducted a survey which included several European countries (France, Germany, 
Great Britain, Italy, and Spain). Each survey asked questions which should measure political and 
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existential expressions of anti-Americanism.7 The theory states both of these measures primarily 
should measure a single underlying dimension of anti-Americanism, with predictable pattern of 
incongruence between the measures.  
A simple crosstabulation between these variables as shown on Tables 2.1 and 2.2 gives 
some initial support to hypotheses one and two. First, there appears to be a straightforward 
positive association, as indicated not only in observing the patter in the crosstabulation, but in the 
correlations, both of which are robust and highly significant. Though both tests support the first 
hypothesis, the Pew data provides the more convincing results. Given the almost identical 
wording of the questions in distinguishing between political and existential expressions of anti-
Americanism, this difference makes sense. The crosstabulations on these tables also show a 
predictable pattern of incongruence as predicted by hypothesis two. The upper right of each table 
shows that high degrees of existential anti-Americanism coupled with low degrees of political 
anti-Americanism are, as predicted, rare. In short, the Tables 2.1 and 2.2 appear to confirm our 
expectations so far. The correlations offer compelling support for hypothesis one. The 
crosstabulations offer initial, though not definitive support for hypothesis two, and obviously, 
more rigorous analyses are needed if we are to accept the reliability of these rather simple 
findings to verify the second hypothesis.  
As an additional confirmation of second hypothesis, we ran a statistical model to not only 
detect, but model heteroskedasticity (isolated standard error terms). We should expect higher 
levels of political expressions of anti-Americanism to be associated with higher levels of errors 
in predicted values of existential expressions of anti-Americanism. To do this we first conducted 
a simple bivariate ordinary least squares regression analysis where:
                                                 
7 The wording of these questions is in Tables 2.1 and 2.2.  
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Table 2.1 – Political and existential anti-Americanism crosstabulation 
Existential anti-Americanism Total
0-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 81-90 90-100 
1 249 126 239 157 82 150 31 14 8 13 1069 
 23.3% 11.8% 22.4% 14.7% 7.7% 14.0% 2.9% 1.3% .7% 1.2% 100.0% 
2 318 191 573 451 427 649 79 61 29 40 2818 
11.3% 6.8% 20.3% 16.0% 15.2% 23.0% 2.8% 2.2% 1.0% 1.4% 100.0% 
Political anti-     2.5 31 9 39 35 47 118 16 11 7 10 323 
Americanism  9.6% 2.8% 12.1% 10.8% 14.6% 36.5% 5.0% 3.4% 2.2% 3.1% 100.0% 
3 75 48 157 174 170 383 98 78 50 64 1297 
5.8% 3.7% 12.1% 13.4% 13.1% 29.5% 7.6% 6.0% 3.9% 4.9% 100.0% 
4 26 8 37 28 32 136 40 44 29 114 494 
5.3% 1.6% 7.5% 5.7% 6.5% 27.5% 8.1% 8.9% 5.9% 23.1% 100.0% 
Total 699 382 1045 845 758 1436 264 208 123 241 6001 
11.6% 6.4% 17.4% 14.1% 12.6% 23.9% 4.4% 3.5% 2.0% 4.0% 100.0% 
Pearson’s correlation: .383 p = 2.3*10-23 
 Political anti-Americanism: From your point of view, how desirable is that the US exert strong leadership in world affairs? Very 
desirable (coded 1), somewhat desirable (coded 2), somewhat undesirable (3), or very undesirable (4)? (All other responses are coded 
2.5.)  
Existential anti-Americanism: Next I’d like you to rate your feeling toward some countries, with one hundred meaning a very warm, 
favourable feeling, zero meaning a very cold, unfavourable feeling, and fifty meaning not particularly warm or cold. You can use any 
number from zero to one hundred. If you have no opinion or have never heard of that country, please say so… Feelings towards 
United States. (Scores range 0-100 and are reverse coded, where 100 indicates “very cold” and 0 “very warm.” No opinion and DK 





Table 2.2 – Political and existential anti-Americanism crosstabulation 
Existential anti-Americanism Total 
 1 2 2.5 3 4  
1 190 52 3 6 7 258 
 73.6% 20.2% 1.2% 2.3% 2.7% 100.0% 
2 131 739 37 65 14 986 
 13.3% 74.9% 3.8% 6.6% 1.4% 100.0% 
Political anti- 2.5 4 23 35 8 1 71 
 Americanism 5.6% 32.4% 49.3% 11.3% 1.4% 100.0% 
  3 56 310 46 338 32 782 
 7.2% 39.6% 5.9% 43.2% 4.1% 100.0% 
4 33 94 22 94 166 409 
 8.1% 23.0% 5.4% 23.0% 40.6% 100.0% 
Total 414 1218 143 511 220 2506 
16.5% 48.6% 5.7% 20.4% 8.8% 100.0% 
Pearson’s correlation: .565; p = 4.1*10-23 
Political anti-Americanism: Please tell me if you have a very favorable (coded 1), somewhat 
favorable (2), somewhat unfavorable (3) or very unfavorable opinion (4) of The United States. 
(All other responses are coded 2.5.)  
Existential anti-Americanism: Please tell me if you have a very favorable (coded 1), somewhat 
favorable (2), somewhat unfavorable (3) or very unfavorable opinion (4) of Americans. (All 
other responses are coded 2.5.)  
 
Political expressions of anti-Americanism = a + b(existential expressions of anti-
Americanism) + e 
We then took the square of the error term and ran a Pearson’s correlation with political 
expressions of anti-Americanism.8 The result of the correlation between the square of the 
unstandardized error and political expressions of anti-Americanism was a positive and highly 
significant for both sets of data. The Pearson’s coefficient for the German Marshall Fund data 
was .216 (p = 2.3*10-23), robust for individual level data. However, the result of the same 
analysis for the Pew data yielded a correlation of .825 (p = 4.1*10-23). Such a high correlation is 
a rare find in the analyzing of individual level public opinion data. Again, we can most likely 
attribute the difference in the robustness of these results to the question wording, which was very 
similar in the Pew data, replacing only the object of the “United States” with “Americans.”   
                                                 
8 The results of the OLS are, of course given the results of the correlations, positive and highly significant (German 
Marshall Fund data: unstandardized beta = .014; t = 32.1; R2 = .146 – Pew data: unstandardized beta = .604; t = 
28.3; R2 = .319). 
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The results of the analyses above, taken together, offer confirmation of the first two 
hypotheses. There is not only a positive association between existential and political expressions 
of anti-Americanism, but the incongruence that exists between the two expressions of anti-
Americanism appear to conform to the theoretical explanation presented, with initial levels of 
political expressions of anti-Americanism representing not only anti-American attitudes, but also 
a degree of subjective constraint. Furthermore, the data from the more consistently worded 
survey yielded more compelling confirmation of the hypotheses. This in itself may offer 
additional support for our hypotheses – when discrepancies in question wording are accounted 
for, our results are noticeably stronger.  
The Psychological Pattern Hypotheses 
Testing the third hypothesis (evaluations of various policy attributes of the U.S. will tend 
not to be considered separately. Instead, they will reflect a pattern where respondents give 
answers of a consistent valence, reflecting a tendency to strive for cognitive consistency and 
avoid cognitive dissonance), demands measures of attitudes regarding various policies of the 
United States. Fortunately, recent Eurobarometer surveys ask a series of questions almost tailor 
made for this very purpose. In the fall of 2002, spring 2003, and fall 2003, Eurobarometer 
surveys 58.1, 59.1 and 60.1 (which were conducted in each of the then 15 member EU countries) 
asked a series of questions about the United States, and whether the U. S. plays a positive or 
negative role in the world regarding a series of issues. These include peace in the world, fighting 
global terrorism, growth of the world economy, fighting global poverty, and protecting the 
environment. Data from Pew (2003) also asks some broader questions regarding general policy 
of the U.S. regarding its ideas about democracy, ways of doing business, efforts to fight 
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terrorism, and taking other countries into account regarding foreign policy. The results of two 
principle component factor analyses testing hypothesis three are presented in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. 
Table 2.3 – Principle component factor analysis 
Opinion about aspects of American policy 
American ideas about democracy  .681 
American ways of doing business .689 
U.S.-led efforts to fight terrorism .668 
Interest of other countries regarding foreign policy .628 
Eigenvalue: 1.78 
Variance explained: 44.4% 
No other factors loaded with an Eigenvalue over 1. 
n = 2,506 
Negative responses are coded 1, positive responses coded –1, and all others are coded 0.  
Precise question wording in appendix 
 
Table 2.4 – Principle component factor analysis 
“In your opinion, would you say that the United States tends to play a positive role, a 
negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role regarding…?” 
Peace in the world .782 
The fight against terrorism .734 
Growth of the world economy .724 
The fight against poverty in the world .817 
Protection of the environment .736 
Eigenvalue: 2.88 
Variance explained: 57.7 
No other factors loaded with an Eigenvalue over 1. 
n = 48,463 
Negative responses are coded 1, positive responses coded –1, and all others are coded 0.  
 
The results support the third hypothesis. Clearly there is a common association to an 
underlying, unmeasured variable. As only one factor loaded with an Eigenvalue greater than one 
in each of the analyses, we can see that instead of taking each attribute of U.S. policy and 
evaluating them separately, it appears that respondents are indeed striving to maintain cognitive 
consistency in their policy evaluations. Furthermore, this analysis yields results that are relatively 
stable over all three time points, and across countries.9 It appears that, in the mind of the 
                                                 
9 A single dimension loaded in each analysis by country and year.  
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respondent, all bad things go together to some extent, and the object in question (the United 
States), is evaluated for the most part on the bases of broad and sweeping generalizations, rather 
than well thought out, nuanced evaluation of various aspects of U.S. policy.  
Testing the fourth hypothesis (overall evaluations of the United States, while being 
guided by overall tendencies toward cognitive consistency, should also be guided by evaluations 
on more salient characteristics) offers more of a challenge that the previous three. First, there is 
no definitive way to determine the salience of an issue in the data available used to test the 
second hypothesis. However, the timing of the data themselves do offer the opportunity to 
observe the results of a natural experiment. Eurobarometer 58.1 was conducted in the fall of 
2002, a time where the United States was making a case against Iraq that included the 
involvement of the international community in dialogue, in particular the United Nations. 
However, by the start of the Eurobarometer 59.1, the U.S. was preparing to invade, with the 
Second Gulf War and occupation occurring shortly thereafter and lasting through the completion 
of the survey.10 If we are to make a somewhat safe assumption – that the U.S. role regarding 
peace in the world will be especially salient in the day when they are waging war, and in the days 
before when the invasion was seen as all but inevitable – then this allows us to observe the 
effects of a natural experiment with which to test hypothesis four.  
Using an OLS regression analysis, we ran the following model: 
Four factor anti-Americanism score = a + b1(view of U.S. peace in the world) + b2(view 
of U.S. peace in the world)(spring 2003 dummy) + b3(2003 dummy) + e 
 
The four factor anti-Americanism score is a variable extracted from a factor analysis similar to 
the one done in Table 2.4, but with only the four non-peace items. View of peace in the world is 
                                                 
10 Eurobarometer 59.1 was conducted from March 18, until April 30, 2003. The U.S. began strikes on military target 
inside Iraq on March 20, 2003.  
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the answer to the first item in the question, and this item is interacted with a dummy variable to 
indicate the spring 2003, which also serves as a control variable. The results presented on Table 
2.5, are in line with the predictions of hypothesis four. The effects of all the independent 
variables are significant and in the hypothesized direction. Perception of peace in the world 
appears to have a strong positive effect on overall evaluations of the U.S., but as the interaction 
effect shows, has an additional impact during the war with Iraq.  
Table 2.5 – Ordinary least squares regression predicting four factor anti-Americanism  
Variable Beta Coefficients Standard Error Standardized Beta T Sig. 
      
Peace in the 
World 
 








-.022 .009 -.011 -2.361 .018 
Intercept 
 
-.176 .006  -27.884 <.001
Adjusted R square: .38 
Number of observations: 32,383 
Dependent variable: extracted scores from four item principled component factor analysis (items 
two through five in table 2.2). 
 
Conclusion 
Several scholars argue that expressions of anti-American can be separated in various 
ways. This includes the view that anti-Americanism can be divided between evaluations of U.S. 
policy and views based on U.S. society and culture (Chiozza 2005b), or the contention that there 
are actually many different anti-Americanisms (see esp. Katzenstein and Keohane 2005). One 
striking (though implicit) characteristic of this literature is that various expressions of anti-
Americanism represent “true attitudes” of the respondent. This presupposes that not only are 
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evaluations of U.S. policy and what the U.S. stands for separate, but that the survey respondent is 
able to sort them out coherently. We propose an alternate explanation.  
This chapter has presented and tested a theory on the nature of anti-Americanism. Anti-
Americanism, as conceptualized here, does not reflect a complex set of “true” attitudes where 
survey respondents give answers consistent with thorough and thoughtful deliberation based on 
the subtle semantics of a survey question. Nor does it represent a multi-faceted set of attitudes 
based on a series of evaluations that carefully weigh the perceived pros and cons of the various 
aspects of U.S. policy. Instead, anti-Americanism represents a broad disposition toward negative 
evaluations of that which is perceived as “American.” It is first shaped by consistency in 
cognitive appraisal, and subsequently expressed in ways that are neither fundamentally cognitive 
nor emotive in nature. It is important to point out that that this does not in any way preclude 
nuances in evaluating various aspects of the U.S., its policies, or its people.11 Instead, it considers 
the limits of the survey instrument and incorporates them into a theoretically consistent 
framework (Zaller 1992) rather than forcing responses into “types” of anti-Americanism that are 
neither empirically nor theoretically justifiable.  
                                                 
11 In fact, in the analyses conducted in the chapter, it measures such nuance. Those who are more willing and/or 
capable of making such distinctions are correctly measured as less anti-American. Furthermore, this notion is 
theoretically consistent with the argument made in this chapter that anti-Americanism is not a dichotomous concept.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE SUBSTANTIVE IMPORTANCE OF ANTI-AMERICANISM 
Now that we have developed and tested a theory regarding the nature of anti-
Americanism, a logical question is “why does it matter”? In short, what substantive effects does 
anti-Americanism have? This chapter addresses the question by first exploring the effects of anti-
Americanism on views about the role the U.S. should play in the world. Second, this chapter 
looks at the impact anti-Americanism has on geopolitical views regarding support for prominent 
geopolitical multi-national institutions, as well as support for one’s own country as an 
international actor. Finally, this chapter explores the complex relationship anti-Americanism has 
on support for Europe, European defense, and the process of European integration. Several of 
these relationships defy “conventional” thinking about the effects of anti-Americanism.  
Implications of Anti-Americanism for Foreign Policy Attitudes 
 
That Europeans see the United States as a major player on the world stage is hardly a 
surprising revelation. Table 3.1 shows the results of a question asked in a 2002 survey of six 
European countries regarding the perceived influence of several countries, plus the EU (German 
Marshal Fund of the United States 2002). 88 percent of respondents scored the U.S. as 8, 9 or 10 
in importance. No other international actor approached this score. Obviously, the prominent role 
of the United States on the world stage is salient. It is the world’s only military superpower, 
spending over $370 billion on military expenditures in 2004, more than then next thirteen highest 
countries combined (Central Intelligence Agency 2006). The U.S. is also the world’s largest 
economy, surpassing China, the world’s most populous country, and the 25 member European 
Union. The U.S. is also very prominent in cultural influence and popular culture the world over. 
Its strength goes beyond mere military and economic capabilities into what Nye (2002; 2004) has 
termed “soft power,” the ability to affect the behavior of others not through inducement or  
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Table 3.1 – Perceived influence of world actors 




0 0.2 1.1 0.4 1.5 0.6 0.7 0.5
1 0.1 0.8 0.5 1.3 0.6 0.6 0.6
2 0.2 2.8 1.5 3.3 1.4 2.5 1.0
3 0.3 5.4 3.4 6.1 3.4 5.5 2.1
4 0.5 8.9 7.6 9.5 6.4 10.0 4.0
5 2.2 19.6 20.6 18.8 17.1 21.9 10.2
6 2.1 16.7 20.2 16.6 17.4 21.3 13.3
7 6.0 17.2 21.1 17.2 21.8 19.2 20.8
8 21.0 16.0 16.6 14.7 19.4 11.8 23.9
9 24.6 4.9 3.5 4.0 6.2 2.3 11.0
10 41.7 4.1 2.6 2.8 3.5 1.9 10.2
Question wording: “I would like to know how much influence you think each of the following 
countries has in the world. Please answer on a 0 to 10 scale; with 0 meaning it is not at all 
influential and 10 meaning it is extremely influential.” 
 
coercion, but because of the inherent desirability of action itself.12 Given the prominent role of 
the U.S. on the world stage, one would expect anti-Americanism to have important effects on 
how people view global politics and the actions of the U.S. In establishing the substantive 
importance of anti-Americanism, it is interesting to look at the significant effects anti-
Americanism has on attitudes regarding the world.  
Anti-Americanism and Salience of the United States 
A vast majority of the Europeans surveyed in six countries in 2002 rated the importance 
of the U.S. on the world stage very high. What effect does anti-Americanism have on this 
perception? Much of the literature suggests that anti-Americanism would be associated with an 
exaggerated estimate of the importance of the United States because of the role of envy and 
jealousy in stoking anti-American sentiments (Hollander 1992; Haseler 1985). Haseler (1985: 6) 
explicitly states that much of anti-Americanism is actually the result of “resentment and envy.” 
                                                 
12 Regarding the influence of American culture, Cohen (2004: 54) writes: “Today, English is the lingua franca of the 
planet for everything from air traffic control to entertainment. U.S. universities dominate in higher education, while 
low- and middle-brow American culture floods a planet that simultaneously loathes and embraces Spielberg, 
Starbucks, and MTV. American music, food, idiom, work styles, and manners are inescapable.”  
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In discussing the contemporary role of the United States as the world’s main military and 
cultural power, Zakaria (2002) argues that one important source of anti-Americanism stems from 
the fact that it is so powerful, and that the very notion of its existence in this capacity makes it an 
obvious and natural target for negative sentiment.  
The theory and findings of the previous chapter suggest a different dynamic. Accepting 
the importance of maintaining cognitive consistency, one would expect that anti-Americanism 
would actually be negatively associated with salience of the U.S. Respondents who are more 
anti-American should demonstrate a tendency to avoid psychological discomfort (see chapter 2). 
The idea of a powerful U.S. that plays a negative role in the world is psychologically distressing.  
Those who are more anti-American should tend to be driven by processes of cognitive 
consistency to evaluate the U.S. as less important. Therefore, there should be a negative 
relationship with anti-Americanism and perceived salience of the U.S. on the world stage.  
Table 3.2 shows the results of a multivariate OLS regression using data from the cited 
2002 survey of six European countries, with perceived importance of the United States as the 
dependent variable. As expected, anti-Americanism shows a strong and significant negative 
relationship to the perceived importance of the U.S. Furthermore, looking at the standardized 
coefficients we see that anti-Americanism also seems to have the greatest substantive impact of 
any of the variables included in the analysis. Age and gender also appear to have important 
effects on the perceived salience of the U.S., with older people and women viewing the U.S. as 
less important on the world stage. It is likely that younger people are more prone to give the U.S. 
credit for having cultural influence through popular media and pop culture trends. Those 
classifying themselves as more conservative politically also tend to view the U.S. as less 
important. In relation to France, which acts as the reference country in this analysis, British and  
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Table 3.2 – Ordinary least squares regression predicting perceived influence of the USA 
 Unstandardized 
 Coefficients Std. Error
Standardized 
Coefficients
Anti-Americanism -.069 .007** -.134 
Age Cohort -.081 .011** -.093 
Female -.092 .035* -.033 
Ideology (Right higher) -.053 .014* -.048 
Great Britain .118 .062  .032 
Netherlands -.112 .061 -.030 
Italy .353 .061** .094 
Poland -.148 .061* -.040 
Germany -.091 .061 -.024 
Intercept 9.757 .099**
Adj R Square: .045  
Dependent Variable: “I would like to know how much influence you think each of the following 
countries has in the world. Please answer on a 0 to 10 scale; with 0 meaning it is not at all 
influential and 10 meaning it is extremely influential.” (All “don’t know” and non-cooperative 
responses were coded 5.) 
** Signifies significance <.001 level two tailed 
* Signifies significance <.01 level two tailed.  
France serves as reference category.  
N = 5,991 
 
Italians perceive the U.S. as being more important, while Poles perceives the U.S. as less 
important. It appears that in order to avoid psychological discomfort associated with accepting 
that the U.S. plays a prominent role in the world, those with high levels of anti-Americanism 
tend to view the U.S. as a less important actor in the world.  
Though the present finding is hardly definitive, its implication is intriguing for 
perceptions of the U.S. and its influence. One popular argument among conservatives in the 
United States that tend to downplay apparent increases of anti-American sentiment around the 
world is, “they might not like us, but they respect us.” The present analysis suggests just the 
opposite is the case – the less the U.S. is liked the less important it is perceived to be. This is not 
to suggest that the perceived importance and influence of the U.S. in the world is likely to lessen 
to any significant degree. A glance back at Table 3.1 is reassuring in this regard. However, it 
 46
does suggest than increases of anti-Americanism will have important implications for how mass 
public will look at the U.S. as an important actor on the world stage, and the more that people do 
not like what they see, the less seriously they will take the U.S.  
Anti-Americanism and International Institutions 
 Another important area to observe effects of anti-Americanism is in support for 
international institutions, particularly those where a respondent’s country shares membership 
with the United States. How should anti-Americanism relate to views about such international 
institutions? Once again, conventional theories, often espoused by conservatives in the United 
States, would suggest that anti-Americanism would be likely to increase support for many, or 
even all international institutions. The reason is that groups in which the U.S. is a part, 
particularly the United Nations, are likely to be seen as a check on U.S. power (Kagan 2002; 
Huntington 1999).13 Insofar as international organizations are likely to thwart, or at least slow 
down, efforts by the U.S. to exercise its power, then anti-Americanism should increase support 
for these organizations.  
We posit that the effects of anti-Americanism on support for international institutions will 
have a different relationship. After all, international institutions have been used to justify 
international actions led by the United States, such as Kosovo in 1999 (NATO) and the first Gulf 
War in 1991 (UN). Moreover, advocates favoring invading Iraq used the United Nations, itself 
based in New York City, as a pulpit of sorts for pushing through Security Council Resolution 
1441, which called on Iraq to cooperate with weapons inspectors of face “serious consequences” 
(United Nations 2002). An especially cynical interpretation of the actions of the United States 
leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq includes the possibility that the U.S. actually used the 
                                                 
13 This could apply to other international institutions as well. The World Trade Organization, for example, has ruled 
against U.S. action regarding issues such as steel tariffs and internet gambling.  
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United Nations’ inspection process disingenuously to provide intelligence on military capability 
and to disarm Iraq in order to soften the country for invasion (Roy 2004). Indeed, Iraq was 
actively in the process of destroying Al Samoud 2 missiles, surface to air artillery found in 
violation of range limitations imposed by the Security Council, when the U.S. and its allies 
invaded. For these reasons we should expect that the more anti-Americanism one demonstrates, 
the more one should tend to oppose international institutions as a whole.  
The 2002 Worldviews data from six European countries again, reveal the effects of anti-
Americanism on support for various international institutions, including NATO, the World Trade 
Organization, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations. The 
results of the analyses of these data are presented on Table 3.3. The effect of anti-Americanism 
on support for each of the institutions is both negative and highly statistically significant in each 
of the models. Consistent with expectations, in each case anti-Americanism is associated with 
lower support for the international institution in question. It is telling that of all the variables, 
anti-Americanism is the only one that behaves consistently, with the control variables have 
varying effects from model to model. Older people appear to be less supportive of NATO and 
the United Nations, age does not appear to have much of an effect onperceptions of the other 
institutions. Gender also does not appear to have much an effect, with the exception of United 
Nations, which women appear to oppose strengthening more than men. Conservative ideology 
seems to be associated with more support for NATO and the WTO, and with opposition to 
strengthening the UN. Not surprisingly, the British, Germans and Dutch seem to believe NATO 
remains much more essential than the French, with no noticeable difference for the Italians and 
Poles. Also not surprising, is the finding that, with the exception of Poland, all countries support 
the strengthening of the UN more than the French. Other notable country effects include the  
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Table 3.3 – Binary logistic regression predicting effects on support for international 
institutions 






















.008 -.070** -.063** .0 .001 -.119** 
Female 
 
-.075 .057 -.130 -.094 -.013 -.221** 
Ideology 
  
.061* .098** .080** .033 .033 -.073* 
Great Britain 
 
-.046 .035 .547** -.146 -.530** .677** 
Netherlands 
 
.468** -.058 .517** .145 -.223 .447** 
Italy 
 
.294* -.183 .148 .304* .387* .743** 
Poland 
 
-.359** .201 .026 -.007 -.486** .061 
Germany 
 
-.133 -.058 .516** -.270 -.805** .425** 
Intercept  .565** 1.209** 1.408** .549* .880** 1.977** 
Cox and Snell 
R square 
.029 .042 .053 .021 .049 .031 
n 6001 6001 6001 3043^ 2958^ 6001 
Dependent Variable:  
a – “Some say that because of the increasing interaction between countries, we need to 
strengthen international institutions to deal with shared problems. Others say this would only 
create bigger, unwieldy bureaucracies. For each of the following institution, please tell me if it 
needs to be strengthened or not.” Answers indicating “Yes, need to strengthened” are coded 1, 
“No, don’t need to be strengthened,” don’t know, and refusals are coded 0.  
b – “Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country (sic) security. Others say it is no 
longer essential. Which of these views is closer to your own?” Answers indicating “still 
essential” are coded 1, “no longer essential” don’t know and refusals are coded 0.  
^ – Respondents were randomly assigned one question or the other.  
** Signifies significance <.001 level one tailed 
* Signifies significance <.01 level one tailed.  
France serves as reference category in all analyses.  
 
Dutch being highly supportive of the WTO, the Italians tending to support the IMF and World 
Bank more than other countries, the Poles showing less support for the WTO and IMF than other 
countries, and the Germans and British showing low support for the IMF.  
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Once again, our main expectation regarding the effects of anti-Americanism is met. The 
more anti-American one is, the less likely that person is to demonstrate support for international 
institutions with which he/she shares membership with the United States. The implications of 
these results are hardly trivial. Anti-Americanism affects not only how mass publics view the 
importance of the U.S., but also seemingly willingness to disengage from the United States in the 
world’s most powerful institutions, or at the very least to withhold support for strengthening 
these institutions. It is not yet clear, however, if the effects of anti-Americanism tend to lead to a 
more isolated worldview, or if anti-Americanism leads to publics supporting international 
institutions and arrangements that exclude the U.S. 
Anti-Americanism: A Source of Isolationism or Support for Transatlantic Disengagement? 
One would expect anti-Americanism to have important implications for views on 
domestic military policies. Given the results of the above analyses, we cannot yet rule out that 
anti-Americanism might lead respondents to support increased independence from the U.S. in all 
areas, including military independence. If the public were to take increases in military spending 
as establishing independence, then we would expect support for domestic military spending to 
have a positive relationship with anti-Americanism. However, there are competing logics at play 
here. Considering that the focus of this project is on allies of the United States (European 
countries), we must consider another possibility. Increases in military spending may themselves 
be construed within the context of a country’s alliance with the U.S. and actually to help the U.S. 
and its agenda. If this is the case, then we would expect anti-Americanism to be negatively 
associated with support for increases domestic military spending.  
Because the countries being studied are allies of the United States, we would expect 
associations with military expenditures to be associated with support for the U.S. Using the data 
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from the 2002 Worldviews survey, Table 3.4 shows the results of a binary logistic regression 
analysis on views of military spending. Overall, the results support the hypothesis that anti-
Americanism is associated with less support for military spending. The relationship in a pooled 
analysis of all six countries is negative and highly statistically significant. This relationship 
appears to hold up across all countries as well, with the exception of Poland, where the 
relationship remains negative but loses statistical significance. It is interesting and perhaps 
illustrative of a Cold War legacy that in all of the Western European countries that are U.S. 
allies, anti-Americanism is associated with less support for domestic military spending. 
Meanwhile, in the one country that was on the other side in the Cold War, anti-Americanism 
apparently has no relationship on support for increased military spending. The only other 
consistent effect is that of ideology, where with the exception of the Netherlands, self 
identification with the right has a consistently positive effect on support for more military 
spending. In the pooled analysis, older people seem to support more military spending in general, 
though this relationship does not appear to be consistently significant across countries, 
demonstrating modest significance in Italy.  
Perceptions of national involvement in world affairs could also be affected by anti-
Americanism. The degree to which this is the case should be affected by the perceived strength 
of a country’s relationship with the United States. If a country is seen as particularly close to the 
U.S., then anti-Americanism should be associated with less willingness to engage in world 
affairs. With the possible exception of France, all of the countries studied have traditionally 
strongly supported U.S. foreign policy. And even relatively lukewarm France has been a U.S. 
ally in the “war on terror,” actively participating in the 2001 invasion of Taliban-controlled  
Afghanistan. In so far as anti-Americanism may not affect how one feels about taking an active  
 51




























.057** .082 .021 .136* .076 .033 -.024 
Female 
 
-.049 -.075 -.122 -.143 -.308* -.176 .480** 
Ideology 
  
.208*** .138* .064 .255** .115* .391*** .310*** 
Great Britain 
 
-.383***       
Netherlands 
 
-1.841***       
Italy 
 
-1.166***       
Poland 
 
.672***       
Germany 
 
-.959***       
Intercept  -1.417*** -1.582*** -2.23*** -2.927*** -.645* -2.502*** -1.95*** 
Cox and Snell 
R square 
.109 .020 .007 .032 .017 .044 .060 
N 6001 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1001
Dependent variable:  
“Now I am going to read a list of government programs. For each, I’d like you to tell me whether 
you feel it should be expanded, cut back or kept about the same.” Those indicating support for 
expanding military spending are coded 1, all other responses are coded 0.  
*** Indicates significance at <.001 two tailed 
** Indicates significance at <.01 two tailed 
* Indicates significance at <.05 two tailed 
France serves as the reference category in the first analysis.  
 
role in the world, we would expect to see less of a relationship in France.  
Again using the 2002 Worldviews data, Table 3.5 shows the results of a bivariate logistic 
regression testing the effect of anti-Americanism on attitudes towards engagement in world 
affairs. In all of the analyses anti-Americanism has a positive effect on disengagement in world 
affairs. The relationship is highly significant in the combined analysis, and in four of the six 
country analyses. In two countries the relationship is not significant. That the relations is not  
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.111*** .150*** .030 .168*** .180*** .136*** .029 
Age Group 
 
.025 -.030 .038 .161* .010 .064 -.046 
Female 
 
.120 .503** -.122 .670* -.058 .095 .089 
Ideology 
  
.131*** .220** .242*** .069 .121 -.021 .107 
Great Britain 
 
.388**       
Netherlands 
 
.883***       
Italy 
 
-.428**       
Poland 
 
.558***       
Germany 
 
.859***       
Intercept  -3.427*** -3.656*** -2.435*** -4.793*** -3.11*** -2.224*** -2.5*** 
Cox and Snell 
R square 
.039 .033 .016 .027 .028 .021 .003 
N 6001 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1001
Dependent variable:  
“Do you think it will be best for the future of [own country] if we take an active part in world 
affairs or if we stay out of world affairs?” 
Those indicating support for staying out of world affairs are coded 1, all other responses are 
coded 0.  
*** Indicates significance at <.001 two tailed 
** Indicates significance at <.01 two tailed 
* Indicates significance at <.05 two tailed 
France serves as the reference category in the first analysis.  
  
 
significant in France is not surprising, given the fact that they do not have as strong of a 
relationship with the U.S., as was discussed above. The lack of significance in the Netherlands is 
more puzzling. Still, in all the other countries, the relationship behaved as expected, and anti-
Americanism seems to result in a tendency to want to disengage from world affairs. Overall, it 
seems that of all the variables observed, only anti-Americanism has a consistent effect, though 
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ideology does show to be significant in the analysis of all six countries, with higher levels of 
conservatism associated with less willingness to engage in world affairs. It is likely that this 
result is driven mostly by Great Britain and the Netherlands, though the relationship is positive in 
all the countries except Germany. With the exception of gender in Italy and Britain (where 
women appear to be less willing to engage in world affairs) and age in Italy (where older people 
appear to be less willing), none of the other variables have a significant effect.  
Is it the case, then, that anti-Americanism leads to greater isolationism? Not necessarily. 
So far we cannot determine if anti-Americanism results in sentiments of isolationism, or if it 
instead leads to a tendency to support a worldview that seeks only non-cooperation with the 
United States. This explains the case of French anti-Americanism not being related to less 
willingness to engage in world affairs as a country in the analysis in Table 3.5. If this is that case 
we would expect anti-Americanism negatively to affect security relationships and alliances that 
explicitly include the U.S., but to the degree that Europeans still want to have alliances with 
other countries, anti-Americanism should positively affect those alliances. Furthermore, anti-
Americanism should lead to some isolationism. To clarify, as anti-Americanism increases, 
respondents should tend to not support transatlantic military alliances (NATO), with that support 
going to alliances that exclude the U.S. (a strictly European security policy) and a more 
isolationist approach (support for disengagement from all such alliances). Eurobarometers 58.1 
and 59.1 ask a question about preference of military alliance, whether one supports defense 
decisions to be made by NATO, the European Union, or one’s national government. Table 3.6 
shows the results of a multinomial logistic regression. The results are consistent with previous 
findings and give a clear confirmation of expectations. Increases in anti-Americanism clearly 
draws support away from NATO, with that support going most likely to an EU-led defense  
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Table 3.6 – Multinomial logistic regression predicting preferences for alternatives to NATO 
for defense policy making 
National governments The European Union Other/don’t know Decisions concerning 
European defense 
policy should be taken 
by ... 
Coefficient (S.E.) Coefficient (S.E) Coefficient (S.E.) 
Anti-Americanism .106 (.029)* .158 (.025)* .011 (.030) 
Ideology -.007 (.016) -.049 (.014)* -.017 (.017) 
Fear of WW3 .131 (.064) .016 (.056) .531 (.070)* 
Fear of WMD -.009 (.069) .040 (.061) -.127 (.075) 
Fear of terrorism -.231 (.074)* -.07 (.066) -.454 (.081)* 
Nationalism  .218 (.041)* -.178 (.034)* .164 (.046)* 
View of EU -.217 (.033)* .297 (.03)* -.318 (.034)* 
Spring 2003 dummy .378 (.054)* .502 (.048)* .408 (.059)* 
Intercept 1.96 (.293)* 1.73 (.274)* 1.02 (.308)* 
Number of weighted 
cases 
32,381      
Pseudo R square .074      
       
Dependent variable: “In your opinion, should decisions concerning European defence policy be 
taken by national government, by NATO or by the European Union?” Possible responses: 
“National governments,” “NATO” (reference category), “The European Union.”  All other 
responses were coded in a separate category.   
 * Indicates significance at < .01 level two tailed.  
Coefficients for country dummies not shown 
 
arrangement, or alternately, and not immaterially, a more isolationist stance where one’s country 
leads defense arrangements. Therefore, anti-Americanism can and does lead to greater 
isolationist attitudes, but more likely it leads to continued support for a military alliance, just one 
that does not include the United States.  
The tables also show that conservative political ideology leads to less support for and 
EU-led defense policy as compared to support for NATO, but has no other significant effects 
(meaning ideology does not make a difference in choosing between NATO and a more 
isolationist approach). It seems fear of weapons of mass destruction has no discernable effects, 
nor does fear of another world war, other than making one unsure about what security option to 
embrace. Fear of terrorism does appear to have an effect of increasing isolationism as well as 
making one unsure, as do feelings of nationalism, which also lead to opposition to EU-led 
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defense. Unsurprisingly, support for the EU has the opposite effect as nationalism. Also, during 
the Iraq war, there was less overall support for NATO across the board, demonstrating that the 
invasion of Iraq had an immediate negative effect on support for the transatlantic alliance.  
The 2002 Worldviews study also asked if the U.S. should remain the only superpower, or 
if the EU should become a superpower like the U.S. Again, we would expect anti-Americanism 
to affect responses to this question, and to be positively associated with embracing a position 
other than the U.S. remaining the world’s lone superpower. Table 3.7 shows the results of a  
 
Table 3.7 – Multinomial logistic regression predicting preferences for alternative to the 
United States being the sole superpower  
EU should be SP There should be no SP Other/don’t know …which statement 
comes closer to your 
position about the 
United States and the 
European Union? 
Coefficient (S.E.) Coefficient (S.E) Coefficient (S.E.) 
Anti-Americanism .182 (.019)* .314 (.021)* .252 (.03)* 
Age Group -.125 (.027)* .014 (.031) .138 (.046)* 
Female .477 (.085)* .527 (.10)* .584 (.146)* 
Ideology  -.199 (.036)* -.278 (.043)* -.148 (.061) 
Great Britain -2.074 (.201)* -.024 (.262) -.364 (.319) 
Netherlands -1.560 (.210)* .772 (.265)* -.247 (.333) 
Italy -.641 (.225)* 1.053 (.282)* -1.305 (.471)* 
Poland -1.557 (.209)* .389 (.268) .174 (.321) 
Germany -2.491 (.20)* .038 (.257) -.965 (.324)* 
Intercept 3.329 (.287)* -.893 (.356) -2.15 (.480)* 
Number of weighted 
cases 
6,001      
Pseudo R square .177      
       
Dependent variable: “In thinking about international affairs, which statement comes closer to 
your position about the United States and the European Union?” Possible responses: “The US 
should remain the only superpower” (reference category). “The European Union should become 
a superpower, like the United States.” “No country should be a superpower [volunteered].” All 
other responses were coded in a separate category.   
* Indicates significance at < .01 level two tailed.  
Coefficients for country dummies not shown 
 
multinomial logistic regression. Once again, the results confirm expectations and are consistent 
with previous findings. Anti-Americanism decreases support for the U.S. being the sole 
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superpower, while increasing support for the EU becoming a superpower, or alternately for 
neither the EU nor the U.S. being a superpower.  
Indeed, anti-Americanism is more likely to result in support for the notion that neither the 
U.S. nor the EU should be a superpower. Running the same multinomial logistic analysis using 
support for the EU becoming a superpower as the baseline shows a positive and highly 
significant relationship of anti-Americanism on support for neither the U.S. nor the EU 
becoming a superpower. Unlike the previous analysis in Table 3.6, respondents are not asked 
explicitly to exclude the U.S. This relationship is further evidenced by the fact that of the 65.4 
percent of respondents who expressed support for the EU becoming a superpower like the U.S., 
56.7% of this majority responded that the EU should become a superpower primarily in order to 
assist the U.S. with international problems! It is highly likely, then, that unless explicitly 
prompted, Europeans associate the EU as working with the United States (and for good historical 
reason). More than anything, anti-Americanism tends to lead people to want a world without the 
U.S. or its probable ally, the EU, as a superpower, a response option that was not even offered by 
the survey, but nonetheless was voluntarily given by 17.6 percent of respondents! This 
relationships is also reflected in the effect anti-Americanism has on eliciting other voluntary 
alternative responses along with being unsure how to respond (which represents 4.5 percent of 
the respondents).  
Age had a negative effect on support for the EU as a superpower and a positive effect on 
responding “don’t know” or giving an alternate response other than not supporting any 
superpower. Women appear to universally want an alternate approach to the U.S. being the sole 
superpower. Self-identified conservatism is consistently associated with more support for the 
U.S. remaining the only superpower, having a negative relationship at or approaching 
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significance across the analysis. Interestingly, though unsurprisingly, all the country level effects 
show that the French have the highest level of support for the EU becoming a superpower. The 
Dutch and Italians were more than members of other countries likely to voluntarily express 
opposition to any superpower, with the German and Poles being more likely to express confusion 
or to give some alternate response.  
Anti-Americanism and Support for the EU 
A cursory look at the previous analyses on Tables 3.6 and 3.7 might prompt one to 
believe that being anti-American makes one pro-European. After all, anti-Americanism has a 
positive and statistically significant relationship with support for a defense arrangement with the 
EU as the major actor, as well as with support for the EU becoming a superpower rivaling the 
United States. Closer inspection, however, may suggest that the relationship between attitudes 
about the U.S. and the EU are not as simple as this relationship. The previous analyses involved 
perception of expansion of the EU’s power, not attitudes about the EU itself. The historical 
reality is that not only have the U.S. and the EU been allies, but the United States has promoted 
the process of economic and political integration on the continent over the past half century. As 
noted above, the U.S. has traditionally been an outspoken advocate of this process. From the 
early days of integration starting with the European Coal and Steal Community, the support of 
the U.S. in this regard has been consistent. This support was mainly an artifact of the Cold War, 
though since then both the Clinton and G.W. Bush administrations have supported the 
“widening” of the EU to many of the former communist countries of Eastern Europe, and has 
continued most recently with the administration of George W. Bush and its promotion of Turkey 
for membership in the EU. 
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Rather than propose that the EU is a natural source of object for anti-Americans who 
want an alternate geopolitical reality, we advocate a much more simple position. It is much more 
likely that those demonstrating more anti-Americanism will actually be less prone to be pro-
European. The reason for this is simple: the EU and the United States are, and continue to be (by 
all reasonable accounts) strong allies. Because of this, we should expect that anti-Americanism 
will actually be negatively associated with support for the EU.  
The Worldviews 2002 data, as well as asking about attitudes about the U.S., asked the 
same set of questions about the European Union. Using the same questions, a measure of “pro-
Europeanism” will be operationalized similarly to the anti-Americanism measure,14 only reverse 
coded. This measure of pro-Europeanism is used as the dependent variable in an ordinary least 
squares regression analysis. The results on Table 3.8. are consistent with expectations. Anti-
Americanism has both a substantively strong and statistically significant negative relationship 
with support for the EU. It appears that despite what a cursory analysis of Tables 3.6 and 3.7 
would suggest, anti-Americanism does not result in support for the EU itself when it is the 
explicit object of evaluations. Among the controls, while it appears gender does not have much 
of an effect on EU support, conservatism and age are both associated with less support for the 
EU. All of the national effects with the exception of Italy are negative, indicating that except for 
the Italians, the French have the highest levels of support for the EU. Not surprisingly, the 
traditionally Euroskeptic British and the newest EU citizens from Poland are the least supportive 
of the EU.15  
Eurobarometer 60.1 conducted in the fall of 2003 asked for the first time a series of 
questions about various policies of the EU, just as previous Eurobarometers had done with the  
                                                 
14 See chapter 2.  
 
15 Though the results are not shown, the main substantive results are consistent analyzing country by country.  
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Table 3.8 – Ordinary least squares regression predicting pro-Europeanism 
 Unstandardized 
 Coefficients Std. Error
Standardized 
Coefficients
Anti-Americanism -.261 .012* -.266 
Age Cohort -.083 .019* -.050 
Female .035 .061 .007 
Ideology (Right higher) -.171 .025* -.081 
Great Britain -1.981 .106* -.279 
Netherlands -.445 .105* -.063 
Italy .747 .106* .105 
Poland -2.089 .105* -.294 
Germany -1.062 .105* -.150 
Intercept 13.418 .170* 
Adj. R Square: .212  
Dependent Variable: pro-European score derived from adding: “From your point of view, how 
desirable is that the European Union exert strong leadership in world affairs? Very desirable 
(coded 4), somewhat desirable (3), somewhat undesirable (2), or very undesirable (1)?” (All 
other responses are coded 2.5.) Plus “Next I’d like you to rate your feeling toward some 
countries, with one hundred meaning a very warm, favourable feeling, zero meaning a very cold, 
unfavourable feeling, and fifty meaning not particularly warm or cold. You can use any number 
from zero to one hundred. If you have no opinion or have never heard of that country, please say 
so… Feelings towards European Union.” (Scores ranging 0-10 are coded as 1, 11-20 as 2, 21-30 
as 3, 31-40 as 4, 41-50 and those answering don’t know and no opinion as 5, 51-60 as 6, 61-70 as 
7, 71-80 as 8, 81-90 as 9, 91- 100 as 10.)  
* Signifies significance <.001 level two tailed.  
France serves as reference category.  
N = 6,001 
 
United States in versions 58.1 and 59.1. Table 3.9 shows the results of a principle component 
factor analysis using these items. The results are strikingly similar to those of Table 2.4, and  
extracting these results can yield a continuous measure of pro-Europeanism16 which again allows 
us to observe the effects of anti-Americanism. However, this Eurobarometer reveals the effects 
of various other positions about the EU, such as evaluations of how well EU democracy works, 
the perceived benefits the EU has for the respondent’s country, levels of support for the project 
of European political unification, and how proud the respondent feels to be European. Once 
again, we would expect that anti-Americanism would have a negative impact on pro-European  
                                                 
16 As in the analysis on Table 3.9 the variables are reverse coded from the analysis on Table 2.4.  
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Table 3.9 – Principle component factor analysis 
And in your opinion, would you say that the European Union tends to play a positive 
role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role regarding…? 
Peace in the world .761 
The fight against terrorism .771 
Growth of the world economy .759 
The fight against poverty in the world .804 
Protection of the environment .764 
Eigenvalue: 2.98 
Variance explained: 59.6% 
No other factors loaded with an Eigenvalue over 1. 
n = 16,082 
Positive responses are coded 1, negative responses coded –1, and all others are coded 0.  
 
sentiments, even when introducing these controls. The results, presented on Table 3.10, show 
that anti-Americanism appears to be strongly and negatively associated with pro-European 
attitudes. Additionally, in a model including four controls for possible sources of pro-
Europeanism, anti-Americanism has the strongest substantive effect according to the 
standardized coefficient. One must consider the possibility that despite the significance of all the 
variables in the full model, the inclusion of all the pro-EU control variables might introduce 
some noise into the model, tending to make the effects of anti-Americanism look comparatively 
greater. Logically, the effects of support for EU democracy, perception of EU benefit, support 
for political unification, and pride in being European, should have more effect on support for the 
EU than anti-Americanism. And they do, but not much more according to the other models. 
Impressively, even when running separate analyses in which only one of the controls were 
included, the substantive effect of anti-Americanism still rival each of the pro-EU controls when 
looked at individually.  
The effects of ideology and gender are consistent throughout the model, though only 
sporadically significant.  Women appear to be less pro-European that men, with gender having a 
significant impact in four of the five models. Ideology does not show significance except in one 
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of the models, where self-identified conservatives appear to be less pro-European. The country 
dummies are not shown, though many of their effects were not significant and the substantive 
effects were generally not robust.  
Table 3.10 –Ordinary least squares regression predicting pro-Europeanism 
 Coefficient (standard error) Standardized beta 
 
-0.208 -0.245 -0.248 -0.220 -0.238 
(0.007)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** 
-0.208 -0.245 -0.248 -0.220 -0.238 
 
0.241 0.538    
(0.017)** (0.015)*    
0.12 0.269    
 
0.251  0.538   
(0.016)**  (0.015)**   
0.125  0.269   
 
0.25   0.420  
(0.011)**   (0.011)**  




  0.335 
(0.01)**    (0.010)** 
0.144    0.263 
 
-0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.009 -0.007 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)* (0.004) 
-0.013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.016 -0.012 
 
-0.028 -0.027 -0.031 -0.071 -0.069 
(0.014)* (0.015) (0.015)* (0.014)** (0.015)** 
-0.014 -0.014 -0.015 -0.035 -0.034 
 
-1.46 -0.392 -0.393 -1.101 -0.994 
(.046)** (0.037) (0.037) (0.044) (0.044) 
     

































     
Dependent variable: Pro-Europeanism from factor score extracted from analysis on Table 3.9 
n = 16,082 
** Indicates significance at <.001 two tailed 




Anti-Americanism and European Integration 
Anti-Americanism clearly decreases general support for the EU, or pro-Europeanism. At 
this point, one important question presents itself. What effect does it have on support for the 
process of European political integration itself? Perhaps we have found a new important factor 
which affects support for European integration.  
Support for European integration has been the subject of much research. Inglehart and his 
colleagues found that “post acquisitive” value changes lead one to reject more nationalist 
sentiments and embrace wider identities, leading to greater support for European integration 
(Inglehart 1970; 1971; Inglehart, Rabier and Reif 1987). Gabel (1998) and Tucker, Pacek and 
Berinski (2002) show that support for European integration largely depends on economic 
conditions. If a person benefits economically from integration, he or she is more likely to support 
it. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) show that aggregate level objective economic conditions lead 
to greater overall support for European integration. Rohrschneider (2002) demonstrates that the 
perception of the EU as a democratic institution increases support for the integration process, 
while Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) comes to the similar conclusion that the “gap” in transparency and 
clean government between one’s national government and the EU lead to support for the 
integration process in the form favoring the current pace of integration. None of the literature, 
however, has focused on attitudes towards Europe’s ally, the United States, as a possible source 
for support for the process of European integration. We have seen that anti-Americanism 
adversely affects general support for the EU, or “pro-Europeanism.” What role does anti-
Americanism play in support for the process of European integration?  
While many of the analyses above do not directly address this question, they are 
suggestive. First, Europeans clearly associate support for the United States with overall attitudes 
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about the EU and its role in the world (Tables 3.8 and 3.10). However, anti-Americanism does 
not preclude support for the process of European integration on the security front, insofar as the 
process empowers the EU and not the United States (Table 3.7), with the effects becoming 
stronger and even more pronounced when the United States is explicitly excluded at the expense 
of European security empowerment (Table 3.6).  
Barring the explicit exclusion of the United States, however, anti-Americanism should be 
negatively associated with support for the general political process that is European integration. 
However, when controlling for the perceived effects of economic benefit, political desirability 
(democracy), and values consistent with being European, these effects may drop out. In short, 
there should be nuances in the relationship between anti-Americanism and support for European 
integration, specifically when other sources of support for integration that should correlate 
strongly with anti-Americanism are controlled for. Table 3.11 presents a correlation matrix from 
data from Eurobarometer 60.1 that includes anti-Americanism and traditional sources of support  
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European  
All relationships significant at < .000000001 level (two tailed) 
n = 16,082 
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for European integration cited in the relevant literature. While some of the coefficients may 
appear less than robust, all of the relationships are highly significant (p < 1.0*10-9 two tailed for 
all relationships). It is likely that support for European integration is led mainly by these other 
variables, and not anti-Americanism. This would suggest that despite the historical support of the 
U.S. for the project of European integration, European still evaluate the process separately from 
the U.S.  
If, however, anti-Americanism continues to have an effect even when controlling for 
these factors that the literature states are key to support for integration, we will have made a 
significant discovery of a new source of support for the process of European integration. Using 
data from Eurobarometer 60.1, Table 3.12 shows results of logistic regression analysis. The  
model with minimal controls behaves as expected. Anti-Americanism appears to be strongly 
associated with rejection of European political unification. The model including variables for 
traditional sources of integration shows, just as the integration literature suggests, perception of 
benefit from membership in the EU, support for EU democracy, and pride in being European are 
all positively associated with support for European political unification. When these sources are 
controlled for, however, effects of anti-Americanism drop out, not even approaching acceptable 
levels of significance (p = .493 two tailed). It appears, then, that any relationship between anti-
Americanism and European integration is spurious, and that support for European integration is 
not directly affected by attitudes toward the United States.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to answer the “so what?” question about anti-Americanism. That 
is, why is anti-Americanism important? Several important effects of anti-Americanism have been 
highlighted. First, true to the notion that people will seek to maintain cognitive consistency to  
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n 16,082 16,082 
Dependent variable: “Are you, yourself, for or against the development towards a European 
political union?” Responses indicating “for” were coded 1, with “against” and all other responses 
coded 0.  
 
avoid psychological discomfort associated with incompatible attitudes, anti-Americanism 
appears to be strongly associated with less salience of the U.S. as a world actor. The more anti-
American one is, the less likely she is to see the U.S. as a powerful actor on the geopolitical 
stage.  
Anti-Americanism also appears to be associated with rejection of international 
institutions that include both one’s country and the U.S. The more anti-American one is, the 
more he rejects mainstream multi-national political institutions such as the UN, WTO, IMF, the 
World Bank, and NATO. Also, there appears to be a strong relationship between anti-
Americanism and an expressed interest in staying out of world affairs among U.S. allies.  
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There also appears to be some link between anti-Americanism and general EU support, 
which is logical considering the traditional position of the United States toward the EU and the 
project of European integration, and that America and Europe have been and remain strong 
allies. Simply put, anti-Americanism decreases pro-Europeanism. It appears, however, that these 
negative effects of anti-Americanism do not apply to support for the process of European 
political integration itself, of which the United States is not a part. When controlling for sources 
of support for European integration cited in the relevant literature, the effects of anti-
Americanism drop out. Furthermore, with regards to security arrangements explicitly excluding 
the United States (such as security and foreign policy coordination including only EU countries), 
anti-Americanism has a positive effect.  
The relationship between support for Europe and support for America is thus highly 
contextual. Insofar as one sees the EU as working with and for the interests of the United States, 
it appears that anti-Americanism has a strong and negative effect on overall support of the EU 
and European integration. However, when the United States is not conflated with the interests of 
Europe, the effects of anti-Americanism appear to drop out. Furthermore, when the U.S. is 
explicitly excluded and involved a change in status quo, anti-Americanism leads to support for 
Europeanization (as is the case for choose in European foreign and security policy over NATO).  
All in all, anti-Americanism does matter. Negative attitudes about the United States affect 
a spectrum of different attitudes, none of which are inconsequential. The countries of Europe are, 
after all, democracies, and recent trends have seen the more democratic institutions of the EU 
(such as the European Parliament) become more and more powerful. If anti-Americanism 
increases substantially, it could have dramatic impacts on the policies of the countries of Europe 
as well as those of the Union, not only toward the United States, but potentially toward some of 
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the most powerful international geopolitical multi-national actors, most likely in the form of 
disengagement.  
How might such impacts, which could hardly be characterized as desirable, be averted? 
Now that important impacts of anti-Americanism on mass opinion have been explored, we must 
go on to explore some of the important sources of anti-Americanism. If we know what leads to 
anti-Americanism, perhaps it is possible to curtail some of the negative consequences. The next 
chapter will deal with the sources of anti-Americanism.  
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CHAPTER 4: SOURCES OF ANTI-AMERICANISM 
What important factors lead to anti-Americanism? There are several possible sources of anti-
Americanism. One obvious source is ideology. Europeans, particularly those with much broader 
social welfare programs, will likely take issue with the United States on ideological bases. 
Possible sources of anti-Americanism also include other factors such as concerns about 
terrorism, another world war, and weapons of mass destruction as well as contextual political 
factors such as a traditionally strong communist party or a strong social welfare system most 
unlike that of the United States.  
Ideology and Anti-Americanism  
One obvious place to look for a source of anti-Americanism is to the political left. 
Domestically, many American political pundits and discussants associate the political left, or 
“liberalism” in the vernacular of the American political system, as being more prone to anti-
Americanism. After all, leftists have much to take issue with regarding American policy, from 
environmental policy to issues surrounding social welfare. Obviously, this pattern is not perfectly 
transferred to the international stage, as seen by France’s right-of-center President Chirac and his 
opposition to American policy toward Iraq, while Britain’s left-of-center Tony Blair supported 
(and continues to support) the U.S. Yet, the United States, in many important ways, represents 
ideas and policies with which the political left in general has some specific grievances. These 
points of contention include international policies fostering the spread and development of global 
trade and relatively unrestricted capitalism, and a willingness to engage in unilateral military 
action when potential allies show hesitance, as well as recognition of America’s domestic 
policies, such as a relatively weak social welfare system and the continued application of the 
death penalty. Figure 4.1 shows median voter scores from 1945-1998 for fifteen EU countries 
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and the United States as measured by Budge et al. (2001), with higher scores indicating more 
conservative tendencies. Figure 4.2 shows Esping-Andersen’s (1991) decomodification scores, 
demonstrating the extensiveness of social welfare countries in eleven Western European 
countries and the U.S. In both Figures, the United States is clearly the outlier, demonstrating 
much greater association with the political right.  Obviously European leftists have much to take 


























Source: Data from Budge et al (2001).  














































Source: Data from Esping-Andersen (1991).  
Figure 4.2 – Decomodification scores in 1980 for Western European countries and the U.S.  
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Observing the immediate effects of ideology on anti-Americanism is simple enough. 
Each Eurobarometer contains a question where respondents are asked to place themselves on an 
ideological scale from 1 (far left) to 10 (far right). Running an OLS regression using each 
separate ideology score as a dichotomous variable will demonstrate the degree to which ideology 
affects anti-Americanism when no other factors are taken into account. Running each ideology 
score separately as a dummy variable also allows us to observe whether or not ideology has a 
linear effect on anti-Americanism. The results are shown on Table 4.1. The analysis of 15 EU  
Table 4.1 – Ordinary least squares regression predicting anti-Americanism 



































N 48,463  
Dependent variable: anti-Americanism  
Standard error in italics.  
*** indicates significance at <.001 one tailed  
** indicates significance at <.01 one tailed  
** indicates significance at <.05 one tailed  
Refusals and those answering “don’t know” serve as the reference group for these analyses.  
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countries shows there is a clear association with ideology and anti-Americanism. In fact, the 
effects of ideological self placement on anti-Americanism are so consistent that, aside from the 
most extreme scores, 1 and 10, the relationship is almost perfectly linear, and those most extreme 
scores so not appear to be extreme outliers, having scores relatively close to 2 and 9 respectively.  
When running the same model for by country (not shown), however, we see that while a 
general pattern remains, this relationship does not hold up as well for every EU state. The 
relationship we see for the combined analysis, where ideology has an almost linear relationship 
with anti-Americanism, shows up strongly in some countries, and not at all in others. There are 
several possible explanations for this.  
One explanation favors political history. Therefore, those countries with a historically 
strong communist party should be more likely to demonstrate a relationship where anti-
Americanism is more clearly associated with ideology. The communist party, which supports 
strong state involvement in the economy and extensive social welfare, are in many ways 
antithetical to the United States. Figure 4.3, which shows the vote share of the communist party 
in each EU country from 1948 until 1988, reveals that support for the communist party was 
highest in Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, and Portugal, equaling or surpassing an 
average of 10 percent of the vote in each of the countries. East Germany also obviously had a 
strong communist party during these years.  
This historical argument should also be applicable where a right-wing dictatorship was 
supported by the United States that those identifying with the left will be more anti-American. 
We would therefore expect that anti-Americanism will have a stronger pattern of association 
with ideology in Portugal, Spain, and Greece, all of which had right wing, anti-communist 





























*Ran on election ballot of a coalition of leftist parties led by the Communist Party  
Sources: Hauss (2000) for France. Gorvin (1989) for all other countries.  
Figure 4.3 – Communist vote share from 1948-1988 
 
Another possible explanation emphasizes domestic political opposition to a government 
which supports the United States. While domestic political circumstances are dynamic, the 
available data present an excellent opportunity to observe the domestic political effects of a 
particularly salient case: the invasion of Iraq. Three Western European countries named by the 
U.S. as members of the “coalition of the willing.” Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands, had center-
right governing coalitions leading up to and during the invasion of Iraq that supported the U.S.17 
Because of the general unpopularity of the invasion of Iraq in these countries, combined with the 
tendency of opposition parties to oppose major policy initiatives of their rivals, particularly 
                                                 
17 The U.K. and Denmark, though members of the “coalition of the willing,” were led by a center-left party and a 
center-left coalition respectively. We expect ideology not to affect anti-Americanism in these cases, since while 
respondents associating themselves with the left might otherwise demonstrate anti-Americanism based on a host of 
factors, such effects will be tempered by partisan and/or ideologically based support for the actions of their 
government. Furthermore, conservatives and right leading respondents will be, generally speaking, less prone to 
criticize the use of military force than left leaning counterparts.  
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controversial ones, we should expect anti-Americanism to be positively associated with ideology 
in Italy, Spain and the Netherlands.  
A final possible explanation highlights the tradition of the social welfare state and how 
this tradition affects the relationship between ideology and anti-Americanism. The United States 
approaches what Esping-Andersen (1992) outlined as an ideal-typical “liberal welfare state,” 
which  is a state with an emphasis on market-oriented approaches to social welfare, where an 
individual’s well being is shaped by, and dependent upon, market forces. Esping-Andersen also 
outlined the ideal-typical “social democratic welfare state,” which is virtually the opposite of the 
liberal welfare state, emphasizing heavy state involvement in social welfare combined with 
decomodification, or the process by which the well-being of the individual is not contingent 
upon market forces. The states most closely resembling the social democratic welfare state 
model for which we have data are Sweden, Finland and Denmark. We expect ideology to be 
strongly associated with anti-Americanism in these countries.  
We tested these relationships using the following OLS statistical model: 
Anti-Americanism = a + b1(ideology score) + b2(strong communist party dummy) + 
b3(U.S. supported right wing dictatorship dummy) + b4(center-right led member of 
coalition invading Iraq dummy) + b5 (social democratic welfare state dummy) + 
b6(strong communist party*ideology interaction) + b7(U.S. supported right wing 
dictatorship*ideology interaction) + b8(center-right led member of coalition invading 
Iraq*ideology interaction) + b9(social democratic welfare state*ideology  
interaction) + e 
The interaction terms (b6 through b9) are of most theoretical interest in this model 
because they indicate the degree to which the effect of ideology varies according to the political 
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and historical context. This is not to deny ideology may have an effect independent of the 
contextual effects of the interactions. Similarly, overall anti-Americanism may be higher in some 
of the contexts outlined above. However, regardless of the independent effects of ideological self 
placement and political/historical context, we should expect ideology to have a greater effect 
where the context suggests ideology lends itself to a greater association with anti-Americanism 
(as outlined above). Table 4.2 shows the results of this analysis. With the exception of ideology  
Table 4.2 – Ordinary least squares regression predicting anti-Americanism  
 
 











Strong communist party during 
Cold War 
 
.255 .029*** .126 
Former U.S.-supported right 
wing dictatorship 
 
.318 .037*** .124 
Led by center-right government 
supporting Iraq invasion 
 
.319 .035*** .125 
Social democratic welfare state 
 
.304 .036*** .119 
Strong communist party * 
ideology interaction 
 
-.015 .005** -.041 
Former U.S.-supported right 
wing dictatorship * ideology 
interaction 
 
-.005 .007 -.011 
Led by center-right government 
supporting Iraq invasion * 
ideology interaction 
 
-.087 .006*** -.186 
Social democratic welfare state * 
ideology interaction 
 
-.061 .006*** -.142 
Constant .149 .024***  
Adjusted R square: .056 
n = 48,463 
Dependent Variable: anti-Americanism 
*** indicates significance at <.001 one tailed  
** indicates significance at <.01 one tailed  
** indicates significance at <.05 one tailed  
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in former U.S. supported right wing dictatorships, all of the interaction variables show 
relationships that are statistically significant and in the hypothesized directions.18 Ideology has 
an additional effect on anti-Americanism most noticeably where center-right governments 
support the U.S. in invading Iraq and in social democratic welfare states, though the additive 
effect in countries with a strong communist party tradition are also significant. In short, it 
appears that the specific historical and political traditions as well as salient circumstances are 
indeed important in shaping the effect ideology has on anti-Americanism.  
Going beyond the most immediately theoretically relevant findings, the analysis in Table 
4.2 has perhaps other stories to tell. First, regardless of the historical and political contexts, 
ideology seems independently to affect anti-Americanism. The interactions show the additional 
effects ideology has depending on the political and historical context – ideology still has an 
effect all its own, with ideological placement on the right showing a highly significant 
relationship with less anti-Americanism, demonstrating that, even when controlling for 
contextual factors, the political left is more anti-American than the right.  
The results in Table 4.2 also point to the overall importance of historical and political 
contexts themselves. In all cases of the contexts for which we statically controlled, the baseline 
of anti-Americanism is higher where historical circumstances as outlined above suggested they 
should be. That is, that particularly where the strength of communist parties were greatest, where 
right wing military dictatorships with U.S. support were present, and where the tradition of 
government-fostered social welfare is most strongly entrenched, anti-Americanism is higher. 
This suggests that factors at work within countries serve to strengthen overall levels of anti-
Americanism.  
                                                 
18 Note that ideology is coded where higher numbers indicate self placement toward the right. Therefore we would 
expect a negative relationship, where placement on the right is associated with less anti-Americanism (indicating 
more anti-Americanism for those on the left).  
 76
Conflict and Security Concerns and Anti-Americanism  
Another possible source of anti-Americanism involves specific concerns of the 
individual. Most important in regard to anti-Americanism in 2002 and 2003 are concerns about 
another global conflict, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction. These concerns are 
especially salient because they are most directly related to the United States with regard to 
Western Europe. The United States was an ally of Western Europe throughout the Cold War, and 
good relations had, for the most part, continued through the decade after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall. If there was to be a world war involving the United States, there was an excellent chance 
much of Western Europe would be involved, and on the side of the U.S. Of fifteen EU member 
countries in 2003, all but four (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden) were full or partial 
members of NATO (France is a partial member). Again, while concern about another world war 
may have independent effects, we are most presently concerned with interaction effects based on 
specific contexts. For this reason we would expect concerns expressed about the possibility of 
another world war to positively affect anti-Americanism among those countries most likely to 
support the U.S. in such a scenario – namely the twelve full NATO members.   
Similarly, the issue of terrorism has been especially salient recently. After the attack on 
the United States on September 11, 2001, the United States has been inextricably linked to the 
issue among Europeans, who were largely sympathetic to the Americans. In a survey conducted 
in late 2001 by Pew, 84 percent of Western Europeans believed widespread sympathy existed for 
the United States in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2005). 
Therefore, we should expect concerns about terrorism after 9/11 to have important negative 
effects on anti-Americanism, but again, this effect should be guided by context. Those 
expressing concern about terrorism that live where there is a history of terrorist violence should 
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express more sympathy with the United States than those living in countries historically less 
prone to terrorism. These areas are Northern Ireland (which has faced terrorism from Protestant 
and Catholic extremists), Spain (Basque separatists), and France (mainly North African Muslim 
extremists). While concern about terrorism may or may not have an independent effect, we 
expect concern about terrorism to have a negative impact on anti-Americanism where there is a 
greater legacy of terrorist violence.  
Another especially salient issue in the time after 9/11 and in the time leading up to and 
during the invasion of Iraq was the question of “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD). The 
possibility that the Iraqi regime could provide chemical, biological, and possibly even nuclear 
weapons to terrorists was the primary justification for invading Iraq. Concern about WMD in 
those countries which were part of the “coalition of the willing” helping the U.S. invade Iraq 
should have a negative effect on anti-Americanism. Again, concerns about WMD may or may 
not have an effect in other countries.  
Finally, there is another important context we must control for – time. While in the fall of 
2002 the United States was making a case for inspections and action against Iraq by the United 
Nations, by the spring of 2003 the U.S. had largely abandoned this avenue in favor of military 
action outside the auspices of any international political body (including NATO). In the eyes of 
many critics, as well as the U.N.’s lead weapons inspector in Iraq, the Hussein regime was 
actually largely abiding by U.N.’s demands for open inspections and complying with orders to 
destroy Al Samoud 2 missiles found in violation of previous U.N. resolutions (Blix 2003). In 
other words, while in late 2002 the U.S. was calling on Iraq to submit to international will, 
months later the U.S. refused to accept Iraq’s compliance as legitimate. Regardless of the merits 
of the case for invading Iraq, or the true extent of Iraqi cooperation in 2003 regarding weapons 
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inspections, the invasion of Iraq was extremely unpopular (as case we outline more thoroughly in 
the following chapter). We expect, then, that a temporal component should affect the 
hypothetical relationships outlined above, and run separate analyses for the fall of 2002 and the 
spring of 2003.  
We test hypothetical relationships outlined above using two OLS regression models, one 
for the fall of 2002, and the other for the spring of 2003. This model will be specified as 
follows:19  
Anti-Americanism = a + b1(concern about WW3) + b2(concern about terrorism) + 
b3(concern about WMD) + b4(Full member of NATO dummy) + b5 (legacy of 
terrorism dummy) + b6(coalition of the willing dummy) + b7(concern about 
WW3*NATO interaction) + b8(concern about terrorism * legacy of terrorism 
interaction) + b9(about WMD* coalition of the willing interaction) + e 
Table 4.3 shows the results. Overall, support is mixed for the contextual hypotheses outlined 
above. First, concern about another world war has an overall negative effect on anti-
Americanism in those five countries that are not full members of NATO. While the effect is 
somewhat tempered by being a full member of NATO in the fall of 2002, before the invasion of 
Iraq, it becomes stronger and more significant in the spring of 2003 leading up to and during the 
invasion.20 This increase seems to suggest that invasion of Iraq made the threat of another war  
 
                                                 
19 In order to test for contextual effect, we use interaction terms. In this analysis are terms in which the variables are 
multiplied by a dichotomous variable, valued 1 or 0, which allow us to observe the effects of a variable where the 
dichotomous variable is coded 1. For example, the coefficient for b7 will measure the additional effects fear of 
another world war has in NATO countries.  
 
20 That is, that in the analysis for the fall of 2002, the overall effect of fear of another world war is negative both in 
NATO and non-NATO member countries, as the interaction variable, while significant and in the hypothesized 
direction, still has a coefficient smaller than the base effect measured in the “concern about WW3” variable. In the 
spring 2003 analysis however, the interaction effect has a greater effect than the base effect, which means that the 
overall effect in those full NATO countries meets expectations.  
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Table 4.3 – Ordinary least squares regression predicting anti-Americanism  
 
 
Fall 2002 Spring 2003 









































R Square 0.025 .049 
N 16,074 16,307 
Dependent Variable: anti-Americanism 
Standard error in italics.  
*** indicates significance at <.001 one tailed  
** indicates significance at <.05 one tailed  
** indicates significance at <.1 one tailed  
 
more salient, and guided the contextual effects of concern for a world war toward the expected 
relationship.  
The effects of concerns about terrorism where there is a legacy of terrorist violence does 
not meet expectations. During both time periods, there is no significant difference between the 
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effects of concerns about terrorism on anti-Americanism in places that have been more prone to 
terrorist violence compared to those with less experience with terrorism. Overall, the effect of 
concern about terrorism appears to lessen anti-Americanism, and this effect appears to be 
virtually the same regardless of past domestic terrorist violence. The effect of concern about 
terrorism appears to be somewhat dampened in the spring of 2003, leading up to and during a 
generally unpopular invasion of Iraq.  
Regarding the third contextual relationship, concern about WMD in those countries that 
were (or were to become) members of the “coalition of the willing” which aided the United 
States in invading Iraq in early 2003, expectations are fully met. The effect in countries that are 
not members of the U.S.-led coalition appears to increase anti-Americanism, while the effect 
within the coalition is both significant and strong enough to overcome this baseline effect. That 
is, within the coalition, concerns about weapons of mass destruction have the expected effect of 
decreasing overall levels of anti-Americanism.  
The contexts themselves appear to reflect a generally explainable pattern. First, the 
NATO countries appear to be significantly more anti-American than those countries that are not 
full NATO members, four out of five of which are politically neutral (France being the 
exception). While this might seem counterintuitive, as the U.S. was pursuing an increasingly 
unpopular policy of willingness to engage in military action with or without the support of allies, 
it makes sense that those countries which have an official military alliance with the United States 
would be more wary than those who would not be taking part in military actions with them.  
Looking at the effects of terrorist legacy, it is important to point out that much of the sample of 
those countries included France, a country which was relatively more anti-American that most 
other European countries. Finally, the effects of membership in the U.S.-led coalition invading 
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Iraq is probably the most straight forward – anti-Americanism is lower in those countries that 
participated in and/or supported the invasion. This seems to be guided by something of a rally 
effect.  This makes sense given that in the fall of 2002, those members of the coalition did not 
yet know that their countries would be helping with the overthrow of the Hussein regime, as 
evidenced by greater support in the form of a rally effect in 2003.  
Overall, the analyses in table 4.3 make it apparent that more than just long term political 
context is relevant to shaping contextual effects of concerns regarding salient issues regarding 
the United States and their effects on anti-Americanism. What is going on immediately 
obviously plays a very large role in these interactive effects. When considering the important 
contextual factors that shape how personal opinions affect anti-Americanism, it is thus important 
to examine not only how the political and historical past may shape these factors, but also what is 
immediately going on in the world independent of such factors.  
Attitudes on Salient Political Issues as Sources of Anti-Americanism  
Having observed the effects of ideology and security concerns and how they are 
conditioned by historical political contexts, it is important to look at attitudes about salient 
contemporary issues and how these shape anti-Americanism independent of historical political 
contexts. Certainly, to some extent, anti-Americanism will be shaped by immediate 
circumstances and political realities. In the 1980s, for example, sources of anti-Americanism 
could be support for Islamic extremists in South Asia, support for the regime of Saddam Hussein 
in Iraq, as well as opposition to a number of past U.S. policies (Sarder and Davies 2002). By 
2003 this could hardly be the case. However, insofar as the policies and interests of the United 
States are seen to be consistent with support for some issues, ideals, and regimes, they should be 
appropriately associated with anti-Americanism. Using data from the Pew Global Attitudes 
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Project collected in late April and early May of 2003, we tested the effects of several such ideas 
on anti-Americanism.  
One possible source of anti-Americanism involves the general concept of “globalization.” 
Crockatt (2003: 57) argues that “To some extent, anti-Americanism… could be said to be a 
reaction to globalization, since the growth of American power and the spread of its influence 
coincided with the expansion of capital on a global scale.” The United States has been perhaps 
the strongest advocate of global free trade and a major beneficiary of technological innovations 
that have been part of the phenomenon popularly known as “globalization.” To that extent, we 
would expect general support for the phenomenon popularly labeled as globalization to be 
negatively associated with anti-Americanism.  
Another important potential source for anti-Americanism regards attitudes about the use 
of military force. In late April of 2003 the United States was seen as the primary occupying force 
in Iraq, having just led a coalition of countries to overthrow the Hussein regime. Before that, the 
U.S. with the help of NATO allies had overthrown the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. More 
broadly, the United States was perceived, and openly presented itself, as a country that was 
willing to engage in military action with or without the broad support of the greater international 
community, and to do so preemptively if necessary. We would expect that general support for 
the concept of preemption would be negatively associated with anti-Americanism.  
One important issue that many speculate is a source of anti-Americanism involves 
support for Israel. According to the Pew 2003 Global Attitudes Project Survey, a plurality 
majority of French, Germans and Spaniards, and a solid plurality of Italians and Britons, believe 
that U.S. policy is unfairly tilted toward Israel, despite the fact that a vast majority of all 
Europeans express support for the right of Israel to exist. We expect both attitudes to affect anti-
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Americanism, with general support for Israel’s right to exist negatively associated with anti-
Americanism, while belief that U.S. policy unfairly supports Israel should be positively 
associated with anti-Americanism.  
The general effects of U.S. policy should also tend to affect anti-Americanism. The effect 
of the invasion of Iraq on the political stability of the greater Middle East was widely discussed 
and debated, both before and after the invasion of Iraq. Many opponents of the invasion and 
critics of the United States argued that invading Iraq would exacerbate ethnic cleavages within 
the country and potentially destabilize the entire regime, possibly leading to a civil war that 
could perhaps even escape the borders of Iraq itself. To this extend, we expect that the belief that 
U.S. policies have made the Middle East more stable to be negatively associated with anti-
Americanism.  
Religion is also likely to play a role in anti-American attitudes. To the extent that the 
United States is seen disproportionately to support Israel, Jewish respondents should be less 
likely to demonstrate anti-Americanism, and identifying oneself as Jewish should have a 
negative association with anti-Americanism. To the extent that the U.S. is seen to oppress 
Muslims and invade primarily Muslim countries, Muslims should demonstrate more anti-
Americanism that other religions, and identifying oneself as Muslim should have a positive 
association with anti-Americanism. Identifying oneself as a Christian may lead one to be less 
anti-American, as there is a common heritage between historically Christian Western Europe and 
predominantly Christian America. Self identifying oneself as Christian should have a negative 
effect on anti-Americanism.  
Using the 2003 Pew data, we tested the hypothetical relationships outlined above, along 
with a series of dichotomous controls for country, using the following OLS model: 
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Anti-Americanism = a + b1(support for globalization) + b2(support for preemptive use of 
force) + b3(support for Israel) + b4(believe U.S. is biased toward Israel) + b5(believe 
U.S. policy stabilizes Middle East) + b6(Jew dummy) + b7(Muslim dummy) + 
b8(Christian dummy) + b9…b12(country dummy) + e   
The results of this analysis, shown on Table 4.4, support all of the hypothesized relationships 
outlined above. Support for the notion of globalization is both negatively and significantly  
Table 4.4 – Ordinary least squares regression predicting anti-Americanism  
 
 
Beta S.E. Standardized 
Beta 
    
Support for globalization 
 
-.258 .037*** -.127 
Support for preemptive use of 
force 
-.238 .029*** -.155 
Support for Israel  
 
-.252 .059*** -.077 
Believe U.S. biased toward Israel  
 
.111 .055* .037 
Believe U.S. policy stabilizes 
Middle East 
-.769 .061*** -.237 
Jewisha 
 
-1.072 .447** -.043 
Muslimb 
 
.462 .249* .033 
Christian 
 
-.231 .062*** -.072 
Germany 
 
-.447 .084*** -.119 
Italy 
 
-.675 .086*** -.179 
UK 
 
-.922 .086*** -.245 
Spain -.012 .087 -.003 
    
Constant 7.154 .151***   
Adjusted R square: .22 
n = 2,506 
Dependent Variable: anti-Americanism 
*** indicates significance at <.001 one tailed  
** indicates significance at <.01 one tailed  
** indicates significance at <.05 one tailed  
a – not recorded as an option in Germany; n = 9 
b – not recorded as an option in Germany; n = 40 
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related to anti-Americanism. The more one supports the phenomenon of globalization the less 
anti-American one is. Also, general support for the notion of preemption is negatively associated 
with anti-Americanism. As one supports the concept of preemptive military action more, he/she 
is logically more sympathetic to the United States.  
Attitudes regarding Israel also behave as expected. First, a general support for the right of 
Israel to exist shows to be negatively associated with anti-Americanism. While supporting the 
right of a country to exist is hardly an endorsement of its policy as a whole, it does suggest that 
even this admission, a rejection of the most radical anti-Israel line (e.g. Israel must cease to exist 
before there can be peace in the Middle East), affects anti-Americanism in a significant way. 
Although further research is obviously necessary to parse out the complete nature of this 
relationship, this finding suggests that anti-Americanism and “anti-Israelism” are linked. The 
other finding regarding Israel, the belief that the U.S. tilts unfairly toward Israel does tend to 
increase anti-Americanism, while not as strong or as significant, does behave as expected. 
The perception of the effect of U.S. policy on stability in the greater Middle East also 
shows to have a strong and significant effect on anti-Americanism. If one believes that U.S. 
policy is making the Middle East more stable, the less anti-Americanism one demonstrates. This 
is consistent with concerns that many critics had before and after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq 
that the actions of the United States and its allies would lead to regional destabilization. Notably, 
of the theoretical variables included in this analysis, the effect of U.S. policy on Middle East 
stability has the greatest substantive impact.  
The religion variables are also all consistent with expectations. Jews and Christians are 
less anti-American, while Muslims are nominally more so. However, we must be cautious about 
these some of these results, especially regarding Jewish respondents, as there are only nine self-
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identified Jews in the survey, hardly representative of the Jewish population of Europe. 
Furthermore, inquiries about religion were asked inconsistently in different countries, with 
Judaism not being an option in Germany, and Islam excluded as an option in Spain. The 
dichotomous country variables demonstrate that, on average, all countries are less anti-American 
than the reference country France. With the exception of Spain, all of these effects are 
significant.  
Discussion and Conclusion  
Several inferences can be drawn about the sources of anti-Americanism from this 
chapter. One major finding is that context is important in shaping the effects of various sources 
of anti-Americanism. In the case of ideology, self association with the left positively affects anti-
Americanism where a leftist opposition disagrees with its government’s support of the invasion 
of Iraq, where there is a legacy of a strong communist party, or where social welfare is strongest. 
The interaction of these variables demonstrates that these political and historical contexts do 
much to guide how ideology affects anti-Americanism. This theme also applies regarding the 
effects of concerns about another world war and of weapons of mass destruction. Where they are 
most likely to be an immediate concern – in NATO and countries that were members of the 
coalition of the willing respectively – these concerns are most likely to lead to greater anti-
Americanism.  
In observing the effects of the explanatory value of the different models shown in Tables 
4.2, 4.3, and 4.4, however, it appears that more than the contextual effects of ideology and 
concerns about security issues, the strongest force driving anti-Americanism is very much policy 
related. It is the policy-driven concerns that tell us the most about what leads to anti-
Americanism. While one must be careful not to read too much into the explanatory value of a 
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statistical model, it is important in this instance. The fact that the third model, which deals with 
policy attitudes, seems to have so much more explanatory value than the other models is not a 
minor point. This difference suggests that the most salient forces guiding anti-Americanism 
among Europeans involve policy attitudes.21 Without addressing the legitimacy or substantive 
relevance of these apparent effects of policy concerns on anti-Americanism,22 we do see that 
specific policy attitudes seem to affect anti-Americanism more than contextual and non-
contextual effects of ideological points of views and personal security concerns.  
                                                 
21 We must draw this conclusion tentatively since we are comparing across models and, due to the constraints of the 
data available (comparable questions are not available in the different surveys used in the analyses in this chapter) 
are not able to test the explanatory powers of the different variables in the same model. Also, it is important to note 
that the dependent variable, anti-Americanism, is measured differently in the third analysis, though the 
comparability of these different operationalizations have already been justified (chapter 2).  
 
22 Though, as shown in Chapter 2, specific policy concerns are not necessarily, and in many cases tend not be, 
directly related to the nature of the issue itself, but rather the overall evaluation of the object.  
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CHAPTER 5: SEEKING TO PREDICT THE CURRENT COURSE OF ANTI-
AMERICANISM: A CASE STUDY 
 
We now look at the trends of anti-Americanism in Western Europe. Insofar as we seek to 
forecast the future of anti-Americanism in Western Europe, we do so cautiously. We do not 
intend to predict the precise future path of anti-Americanism, but rather suggest in the broadest 
terms what its general level will be.  We should also note that by stressing one particular event, 
the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, arguably that this limits the generalizability of the argument 
presented here.  
We have already discussed how anti-Americanism is formed from internal cognitive 
processes (chapter 2). Now we look at how ideas of anti-Americanism are diffused in mass 
publics. In doing so, we go from looking at individual level to aggregate level processes of the 
formation and diffusion of anti-Americanism. It is important to stress that the individual 
processes that create anti-Americanism discussed previously do not change. However, the spread 
of anti-Americanism among mass publics, while not conflicting with the individual processes, 
has a dynamic all its own.23  
To the degree that it is possible forecast trends in anti-Americanism in the form of a new 
baseline of greater anti-Americanism, we expect to observe a certain pattern. The process by 
which anti-Americanism is diffused in mass publics should be rather straightforward. First there 
should be some catalyst that triggers a strong anti-American reaction. This should be followed by 
a solidification of anti-American attitudes across a public coupled with a stabilization of anti-
                                                 
23 This is not to argue that the role of the main catalyst for the diffusion of anti-Americanism in mass publics, 
namely opinion leadership, which will be further outlined below, does not play a role in the formation of anti-
Americanism on the individual level. Indeed, individually anti-Americanism can and should be affected by 
interaction with other people, as interactions with others have been shown to affect an individual’s attitudes through 
processes of cognitive consistency (Newcomb 1961).  
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Americanism in the public, where a new, greater level of anti-Americanism should become the 
new norm. 
The New Norm: Greater Levels of Anti-Americanism and How They Came About 
Not many events could trigger a new, greater level of anti-Americanism. Such 
phenomena should be limited to major international political events involving the United States, 
are largely unpopular, seen as unwarranted, occur on a very large scale, and believed to be 
carried out on false pretenses. While the United States was involved in many large-scale and 
largely unpopular activities over the past several decades, such as the Vietnam War and the 
deployment of nuclear missiles in continental Europe, until 2003 no single unpopular event 
occurred on a scale large enough to trigger a shift in the overall level of anti-Americanism across 
the entire world.  
Using various data sources, Ray and Johnston (manuscript) have compiled information 
on the general level of approval of the U.S. from the years just after the end of World War II up 
until the present, as shown in Figure 5.1. While it is tempting (and certainly interesting!) to look 
at the overall trends in pro and anti-American sentiment over time, the immediate topic suggests 
most relevantly that we compare the last few time points on the right side of the graph to the 
overall trend in anti-Americanism. While sentiment toward the U.S. has seen its share of ebb and 
flow since the Second World War, nothing seems to approach the current negative evaluations of 
the United States seen in recent years. The overall increase in we observed from the fall of 2002 
to the spring of 2003 is observable in the graph. The graph shows that this kind of drop has never 
been seen before. A one-way ANOVA analysis shows the statistical difference is just as great as 
it seems in a cursory observation of the Figure, as overall attitudes of the Untied States are 
shown to be lower after the invasion of Iraq (F = 109; p = 2.7*10-19).  
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Points represent percentage of respondents with a positive/good opinion of the United States minus percentage of respondents with a negative/bad view of the United States.  Data 
taken from Merritt and Puchala (1968), Crespi (1982), Gallup (1978), Eurobarometer surveys # 17, 22, 24, 27, 28, 32, Smith and Wertman (1992) , Pew (2004), Program on 
International Policy Attitudes (2005).
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In looking more closely at the reasons for this drop, it is important to explore popular 
perception of the events leading up to the invasion of Iraq. It is hard to argue that criticism of the 
United States in regard to the events surrounding invasion of Iraq was merely rhetoric by “the 
usual suspects” such as Islamic extremists, anti-Western nationalists, and radical leftists. 
Furthermore, the actual invasion itself did not mark the beginning of greater anti-American 
rhetoric. Among those offering the most unqualified criticism were Nobel Peace Prize recipient 
Nelson Mandela and Pope John Paul II.  Said Nelson Mandela just before the invasion of Iraq, 
“If there is a country that has committed unspeakable atrocities in the world, it is the United 
States of America. They don't care” (Columbia Broadcasting System 2003). Pope John Paul II 
used his Christmas Day Address in 2002 to condemn the upcoming war in Iraq, urging peace and 
reiterating the position of the Vatican that “preventative” war is not morally justifiable (Cable 
News Network 2002). After hostilities had begun, the Pope portrayed the invasion of Iraq as an 
unjust war, proclaiming that “Violence and weapons can never resolve the problems of man” 
(Reuters 2003). Indeed, questions about U.S. policy preceded the events leading up to the 
invasion of Iraq. Cohen (2004: 59) argues, “In retrospect… the brusque manner of the Bush 
administration’s rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, and other 
measures dear to European hearts created a climate of opinion that made the prewar crisis over 
Iraq much worse than it need have been.”  
Despite the large support for the invasion of Iraq in the United States, as depicted in the 
supposedly liberal editorial pages of the New York Times and Washington Post, the events 
leading up to the invasion of Iraq outside the United States were seen in a completely different 
light. On November 8, 2002, Iraq proclaimed it would comply with U.N. Resolution 1441, which 
demanded Iraq allow weapons inspectors uninhibited access to the country, grating Iraq “a final 
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opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations,” and that barring this compliance, Iraq 
“will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations” (United 
Nations 2002). According to Hans Blix, the United Nations’ lead weapons inspector in Iraq, 
several months later and just before the U.S.-led invasion began, the country was largely in 
compliance with demands of the international community (Blix 2003). Iraq was, for example, 
allowing spontaneous “surprise” inspections with no interference, as well as uninhibited aerial 
surveillance. The regime was also actively complying with U.N. orders to destroy Al Samoud 2 
missile, which violated range limitations for Iraq as set by previous U.N. Security Council 
resolutions. Despite some early setbacks with regards to Iraqi cooperation, Blix argued, “One can 
hardly avoid the impression that, after a period of somewhat reluctant cooperation, there has 
been an acceleration of initiatives from the Iraqi side since the end of January” (Blix 2003). This 
view reflected the general consensus of the governments of most countries that the evidence that 
Iraq was not cooperating with the inspection process was debatable at best, and that the 
inspection process needed more time.   
Despite this apparent cooperation, and to the dismay of much of the international 
community (see e.g. Murray 2003), the United States and its allies continued to insist that the 
Hussein regime was offering little to no compliance with main points of Resolution 1441. In 
noting the increased cooperation of Iraq in the inspection process, Blix noted that, while such 
efforts were welcomed, “the value of these measures must be soberly judged by how many 
question marks they actually succeed in straightening out. This is not yet clear” (Blix 2003). 
While the majority of the international community took this to mean that the inspection process 
must be given more time (M2 Presswire 2003), the United States and its allies obviously came to 
a very different conclusion. The main concern of the United States and its allies was not the 
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inspections themselves, but proving that weapons of mass destruction that Iraq had possessed 
had been destroyed as they claimed. In addressing this concern, Blix wrote:  
There is a significant Iraqi effort underway to clarify a major source of uncertainty as 
to the quantities of biological and chemical weapons, which were unilaterally 
destroyed in 1991.  A part of this effort concerns a disposal site, which was deemed 
too dangerous for full investigation in the past.  It is now being re-excavated.  To 
date, Iraq has unearthed eight complete bombs comprising two liquid-filled intact R-
400 bombs and six other complete bombs.  Bomb fragments were also found.  
Samples have been taken.  The investigation of the destruction site could, in the best 
case, allow the determination of the number of bombs destroyed at that site.  It should 
be followed by a serious and credible effort to determine the separate issue of how 
many R-400 type bombs were produced.  In this, as in other matters, inspection work 
is moving on and may yield results (Blix 2003). 
 
This sentiment was largely reflected by French Prime Minister Jacque Chirac and German 
Chancellor Gerhardt Schroeder. In responding to President Bush’s ultimatum to Saddam Hussein 
that invasion was imminent and that he leave Iraq immediately, Chirac pronounced, “Since the 
start of the Iraq crisis, France has been at pains to make the necessary disarmament of Iraq 
possible under the authority of the United Nations. This disarmament is under way. The 
inspectors are proof of this” (British Broadcasting Corporation 2003). In a speech addressed to 
the German public, Schroeder pronounced, “Iraq today is a country that is under comprehensive 
UN supervision. The disarmament steps that the UN Security Council has demanded are being 
increasingly fulfilled” (British Broadcasting Corporation 2003). Despite this, the U.S. and its 
allies continued to insist that only full and complete cooperation with UN Resolution 1441 would 
do, a view expressed forcefully by U.S. representative to the United Nations John Negroponte 
(AFX European Focus 2003), as well as British Prime Minster Tony Blair (Press Association 
2003).  
In short, while the U.S. certainly had supporters, the popular view was that while Iraq 
could probably do more to comply with the inspection process, progress was being made. 
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Hussein’s regime was no longer unabashedly impeding the inspection process, and that barring 
reports of complete lack of cooperation of disarmament by the weapons inspectors, the 
inspections should continue and Iraq should be disarmed peacefully. This view was expressed 
not only in several European editorial pages (e.g. Fitzgerald 2003; David Roy 2003), but also by 
the political leaders of Europe (Washington Post 2003). This was part of the larger consensus 
that Iraq was no longer blatantly defying the inspections process, and was indeed largely 
complying with the demands of the international community to disarm peacefully (Agence 
France Presse 2003a). However, the position of the U.S. and its allies was that “largely 
complying” was simply not good enough. Just days after Blix termed Iraqi cooperation as 
“proactive” (Agence France Presse 2003a), the U.S., UK, and Spain announced a deadline for 
Iraq compliance with disarmament before military action would be taken (Agence France Presse 
2003b).  
Many in the international community argued that the U.S. led an invasion that was illegal 
according to international law. This view was expressed not only by protestors of the war, but 
also in a press release by the International Commission of Jurists (2003) and several other 
experts in international law (The Australian 2003), as well seven MPs in Tony Blair’s own 
Labour Party (The Mirror 2003), and the governments of France, Germany, Russia and China 
(The Independent 2003). In fact, the systematic destruction of the Samoud 2 missile was ongoing 
when the U.S.-led coalition started to invade the country (Blix 2003). Regarding the destruction 
of these missiles, a move Blix called “a very significant piece of real disarmament,” the White 
House responded that the moved was instead “propaganda wrapped in a lie inside a falsehood” 
(The Scotsman 2003). Many Europeans concluded that the real goal of the invasion was to 
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establish a strong military presence in the oil rich Middle East and maintain control over vast 
quantities of oil (see e.g. Roberts 2003; Smyth 2003).  
To be sure, there was a strong case to be made that the Hussein regime did indeed possess 
weapons of mass destruction. Almost every country’s international intelligence corroborated this. 
Taking this intelligence with Iraq’s continued insistence that it had no WMD, there was certainly 
some reason to suspect that Iraq was not complying with Resolution 1441. Regardless of the 
actual level of compliance by Iraq, however, the perception of much of the world was that the 
U.S. added two and two, and publicly, loudly, and unapologetically stated to the world that the 
answer was five, and did so as pretence to go to war.  
As a result, several countries, including staunch U.S. allies such as Germany, New 
Zealand, and Canada, the latter two of whom supported the U.S. in the Vietnam War, as well the 
officially neutral countries Sweden and Switzerland, went so far as to officially condemn the 
invasion. The European Parliament also declared the invasion illegal. As Figure 5.1 shows, this 
general level of unpopularity is also clearly indicated by the overall trends in opinions about the 
United States.  
Observing and Forecasting the Underlying Trends in Anti-American Attitudes 
A cursory analysis using Eurobarometers 58.1, 59.1 and 60.1 looking at the mean scores 
of anti-Americanism before and after the invasion of Iraq this narrative of rising anti-
Americanism. Anti-Americanism is clearly higher, with the effects being both substantively 
(.332) and statistically (t = 155.1) significant from the fall of 2002 to the spring and fall of 2003. 
This observation obviously does not help us predict the future course of anti-Americanism 
insofar as we cannot predict international events such as the invasion of Iraq. However, it does 
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suggest that world events may shape how subsequent evaluations of the United States take place, 
and the context in which they take shape.  
Despite this obvious rise in anti-Americanism in the wake of the invasion of Iraq, clearly 
other factors lead to increases in anti-Americanism. To argue that anti-Americanism is strictly a 
product of such external sources is overly reductionistic. It fails to address anti-Americanism as a 
public opinion phenomenon – that is, that it is the subjective perception of events that drive 
changes in views, not a mechanical reaction to the events themselves. For this reason, it is 
important to observe some of the important internal trends that might demonstrate how anti-
American attitudes will change, and might provide some clues about the future of the 
phenomenon.  
One rather straightforward explanation presents itself: awareness. Those who are more 
engaged and aware of the political world may betray future trends in the public at large. While it 
was certainly a common perception that the Bush administration was not receptive to notions of 
international cooperation, it does not necessarily follow that most of the public was especially 
cognizant of this. After all, classic public opinion theory and research is rife with examples of 
mass publics that are vastly ignorant of supposedly widely known facts (e.g. Berelson, 
Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1948; Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964). Insofar as mass publics are 
receptive to such views (as they will inevitably be to some degree), we would expect those who 
are more politically engaged to be most receptive, and most knowledgeable.  
Citizens that are “in the know” may be more likely to demonstrate characteristics that the 
rest of the population will go on to demonstrate. These more engaged citizens should be the first 
to acquire the underlying and growing anti-Americanism expressed by relevant elites, as they 
will be more likely to be receptive to anti-American messages that were being disseminated from 
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elites such as Nelson Mandela, Pope John Paul II, Jacques Chirac, Gerhardt Schroeder, and 
others. If a trend of increased anti-Americanism is forthcoming, then it stands to reason that it 
will rise first among those most knowledgeable and aware of the political world. So, how are we 
to measure such awareness?  
One possible way is education. One could argue that the more educated constitute an elite 
that will foresee popular trends before they happen. If anti-Americanism is rising, or about to 
rise, it stands to reason that the most educated segments of the population will demonstrate 
higher levels of anti-Americanism before those with less education. However, a look a Figure 5.2 

































by education level within the context of its corresponding point in time, education does not 
appear to be a predictor of the increasing levels anti-Americanism. While overall levels are 
obviously going up, the difference in anti-Americanism between groups with different education 
levels appear to be fairly stable. The second quartile is the most pro-American group over all 
three time points, while the most educated group is the most anti-American, with the exception 
of spring 2003, where they are virtually the same of the least educated quartile in anti-
Americanism. If awareness is an indicator of trends in anti-Americanism, education level does 
not appear to be an effective predictor of such trends.  
Another possible way that political awareness could manifest itself is through a classical 
concept in public opinion literature, opinion leadership. Though the idea of the importance of 
opinion leadership was first introduced in some of the earliest scholarly work in public opinion 
(Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948; Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954), subsequent 
research in public opinion has backed up the utility of this concept (Black 1982; Popkin 1992; 
Lenart 1994). The basic argument does not focus on political elites, but rather “regular” people. 
The public, therefore, “consults with itself” regarding the important matters of the day (Berelson, 
Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954, 109). However, there is an important pattern to those who lead 
public opinion – mass opinion does not just spontaneously occur. Patterns of interpersonal 
communication lead to the formation of mass opinion, with those more engaged in political 
discourse shepherding the opinions of the less engaged. As the views of the opinion leaders 
diffuse among the less attentive public, anti-Americanism among those with different levels of 
opinion leadership should become noticeably closer to each other.  
Using a measure of opinion leadership very similar to measures used by previous 
scholars (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948; Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954; Black 
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1982; Rogers and Cartano 1962), we observe the relationship between opinion leadership and 


























    
    
    
 
Figure 5.3 – Anti-Americanism by time point level over opinion leadership levels 
 
positive association with opinion leadership and anti-Americanism during the lead up to the 
invasion of Iraq. Also, during the spring 2003, overall levels of anti-Americanism are clearly 
higher. Interestingly, however, the relationship between anti-Americanism and opinion 
leadership has noticeably dropped off. Furthermore, those exhibiting the highest levels of 
opinion leadership appear to be less anti-American in the spring of 2003. While this difference 
does not quite reach traditional levels of statistical significance (t = 1.3), it is suggestive. 
Furthermore, consistent with expectations, this seeming downward trend in those scoring highest 
in opinion leadership is met with an overall leveling out of anti-Americanism in both the spring 
                                                 
24 This was constructed by observing responses to: “When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss 
political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?” and “When you hold a strong opinion, do you ever find 
yourself persuading your friends, relatives or fellow workers to share your views? Does this happen...? often; from 





and the fall of 2003 between opinion leaders and the rest of the public, resembling a “whiplash” 
effect.  
Figure 5.4 shows the same relationship as Figure 5.3 country by country. Once again, the 
figures are for the most part consistent with expectations. With the exception of less populous 
Sweden and Luxembourg, the only places where expectations are not met is where the country 
participated in the war. Denmark only partially meets the expectations we would expect, with 
trends in the relationship between opinion leadership and anti-Americanism during the Fall of 
2002 seeming to forecast an overall increase in anti-Americanism during the Spring of 2003. 
Spain, despite being part of the coalition of the willing, seems to behave as we would expect, 
with the relationship between opinion leadership and anti-Americanism seeming to forecast an 
overall increase, then a stabilization of anti-Americanism.  
It is worth noting that in these countries, overall levels of opinion leadership appear to 
have a simple positive relationship with anti-Americanism. One explanation could be that those 
who are not as engaged in political discourse are more willing to offer unqualified support for 
their country’s military effort, in which they are obviously siding with the United States. This is 
not to suggest that opinion leaders in these countries are less patriotic, but perhaps those more 
willing to engage in political discourse are more willing (and perhaps more able) to distinguish 
between support for their country’s endeavors and support for the United States.  
In all other countries observed in Figure 5.4, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, 
Ireland, Portugal and Finland, the relationship between anti-Americanism and opinion leadership 
appears to forecast the overall level of anti-Americanism at the next time period. In some 
countries this is illustrated by an overall stabilization of anti-Americanism across levels of 
opinion leadership (Ireland, Belgium, Spain, Finland, and to a large degree Germany), while in 
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Figure 5.4 (continued)  
 






























































































































































Figure 5.4 (continued)  
 













































































others levels of anti-Americanism at different time points appear to be affected by a continually 
dynamic relationship between anti-Americanism and opinion leadership (France, Greece, 
Portugal and Austria). All in all, except where the processes are precluded by a rally effect, 
opinion leadership does tell us where overall levels of anti-Americanism are headed,  
The New Anti-American Norm 
So far we have suggested that trends in anti-Americanism are observable by looking that 





leadership are associated with higher anti-Americanism at time t, overall levels of anti-
Americanism will be higher at time t+1. This relationship shows to be true in most of the fifteen 
countries observed, including all of the most populous countries not involved in the invasion of 
Iraq, as well as Spain. Furthermore, one can see a dramatic rise in anti-Americanism from the 
fall of 2002 to the two time points in 2003. A simple t test offers unambiguous support for this (t 
= 155.1; difference of .332 in anti-Americanism). This, along with the evidence already 
presented on Figure 5.1 makes it clear that anti-Americanism was greater after the invasion of 
Iraq than at any other time before it.  
However, the question remains whether this significant decline represents a new low in 
Western European opinion toward the United States, or merely a dramatic but temporary drop. 
One way to answer this is to observe the levels of anti-Americanism among disparate cohort 
groups, such as age, educational level, gender, income level, and ideology. If the effect is 
sporadic across different cohort groups, with those groups who tend to already be predisposed 
toward greater anti-Americanism showing the greatest increases in anti-Americanism, then we 
can expect the new anti-American trend to be temporary. However, if the level of increased anti-
Americanism is very similar between different cohort groups, we would expect that a new level 
of anti-Americanism has diffused among all groups being observed. This is how we would 
expect anti-Americanism to spread if there was a new, higher baseline for anti-Americanism.  
Table 5.1 shows anti-Americanism scores by in each of the time points by age group. 
Interestingly, the least overall anti-American group is the group aged 15-18, while the most anti-
American is the 19-30 year olds. It is certainly possible that the while 19-30 year olds are more 
reactive to U.S. policy, the 15-18 year olds are more likely reactive to popular aspects of 
American culture. If one allows for this explanation as the reason for the seeming positive blip in 
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the youngest group surveyed, it certainly appears that high levels of anti-Americanism will not 
soon turn around. However, while it is certainly interesting to compare and contrast the different 
levels of anti-Americanism among different age cohorts, and speculate on their causes, such 
analyses are not germane to our argument about the effects after the invasion of Iraq.  
Table 5.1 – Mean anti-Americanism over time by age cohorts 
  Anti-Americanism  
 
 














-.100 .091 .105 .031 





-.04 .093 .088 .048 
51-60 
 
-.072 .052 .035 .004 
61-70 
 
-.132 .035 -012 -.038 
71+ 
 
-.161 -.026 -.051 -.078 
Total -.099 .059 .038 .000 
 
Most relevant about our argument of a new trend of increased anti-Americanism is the 
differences between age groups across different periods of time. Another look at Table 5.1 shows 
that anti-Americanism remains relatively stable, decreasing somewhat from the spring to the fall 
of 2003. Across each age group, anti-Americanism is higher in the fall of 2003 than it was a year 
before. This observation also holds up across education levels. A look back at Figure 5.2 shows 
that anti-Americanism goes up across all education levels after the invasion of Iraq, and remains 
relatively stable from the spring to the fall of 2003.  
 106
So far we have observed increased levels of anti-Americanism in all segments of society 
across age, and education level, as well as those scoring low on political engagement/opinion 
leadership. We should expect this change to show up in other ways. Figures 5.5 and 5.6, and 
Table 5.2 demonstrate this same phenomenon across income level, political ideology, and sex.  
 
Table 5.2 – Mean anti-Americanism over time by sex 
  Anti-Americanism  
 
 














-.098 .086 .055 .014 

























































Figure 5.6: Anti-Americanism by time point level over ideology 
 
from this we can see that anti-Americanism has increased across all these segments of European 
society. It does indeed appear, then, that anti-Americanism has stabilized.  
Discussion and Conclusion  
The premise of this chapter is that for a new higher baseline level of anti-Americanism to 
become the norm several events had to take place. First, a catalyst had to trigger a strong anti-
American reaction in mass publics. This catalyst occurred in the events surrounding the invasion 
of Iraq. The invasion itself did not necessarily increase levels of anti-Americanism, but the 
perception that the United States was failing to genuinely engage the international community. 
The invasion certainly exacerbated the building anti-Americanism we see in the fall of 2002 by 
observing much of the rhetoric of political elites and the measurable attitudes of the more 





(finally) cooperating with the demands of the international community, rightfully heading off 
military action, and the U.S. and its allies decided to invade anyhow. This led to widespread 
description of the effort as unjust, illegal, or both.  
Second, anti-Americanism had to become greater and show stability across all levels of 
European society. Across all levels of education, political engagement, age, sex, income level, 
and political ideology anti-Americanism increased during the invasion of Iraq, and this showed 
stability months after invasion and during the occupation. Clearly, anti-Americanism had 
diffused as we argued it should. Finally, we saw the long term trends of anti-Americanism and 
how it reached a new greater level after the invasion of Iraq across the three most populous 
European countries.   
In the midst of all these factors, it appears that the most politically engaged first saw the 
handwriting on the wall. The observations made on Figures 5.2, 5.5, and 5.6, and Tables 5.1 and 
5.2 demonstrate a universal increase in levels of anti-Americanism across age, sex, education, 
income, and ideology. This is not the case for those scoring higher on opinion leadership, who 
seemed to be most receptive to messages of a growing political storm on the international stage 
involving Iraq as reflected by many political elites. In pointing this out it is important to 
emphasize that opinion leaders did not cause the levels of anti-Americanism to increase anymore 
than a weathervane causes the wind to change direction.25  
While the conclusions reached here are tentative, they are also quite dim. Anti-
Americanism is higher than ever, and may have reached a new base level. While we will have to 
observe carefully whether sentiment toward the United States will ever return to Cold War 
                                                 
25 This is not to argue that political engagement/opinion leadership does not lead to the diffusion of anti-
Americanism. Quite the contrary, those who are more politically engaged are indeed more likely to convince those 
with whom they interact of their views. However, it is unlikely that had the invasion of Iraq not taken place that the 
effects of the opinion leaders on the diffusion of anti-Americanism would have led to the dramatic increase in anti-
Americanism we see from the fall of 2002 to the spring of 2003.  
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levels, this chapter has argued that this does not appear to be the case. Particularly with recent 
developments, such as the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, international objection to treatment of 
detainees at the Guantanamo Bay prison, the reelection of the highly unpopular President Bush, 
and most recently the disclosure of the existence of secret prisons where terrorist suspects are 
held, there is no reason to believe that anti-Americanism will reverse course any time soon. 
There is every indication to believe that, barring some dramatic unforeseen event that creates 
widespread popularity and/or sympathy for the United States, a new, more anti-American 
Western Europe is likely here to stay.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
This project has sought to offer a contribution to the study of anti-Americanism that 
moves beyond much of the hitherto research on anti-Americanism arguing anti-Americanism 
results from some inherent yet mysterious moral and spiritual corruption that causes anti-
Americans to hate America because of the very things that are at the “core” of what America and 
its people stand for (see esp. Hollander 1992; Spiro 1988). At the core of this argument is that 
anti-Americanism has nothing really to do with what America does. “They” hate America for 
what it is. Internal conditions determine anti-Americanism, which is by nature a primarily 
emotional phenomenon. This precludes cognitive evaluations of anti-Americanism, since, after 
all, there is no reason for anti-Americanism. It simply is.  
Other research has argued that anti-Americanism is fundamentally a reaction to U.S. 
policy, and therefore it is inherently rational and approaches pure cognitive evaluations, having 
little or no emotive component (e.g. Kizilbash 1988). Since it is U.S. policy many foreigners 
oppose, anti-Americanism is not a cultural reaction of culture or an expression of contempt for 
democracy. Anti-Americanism is something which is external in nature, and thereby 
fundamentally cognitive. As such, emotional reactions do not make up the core of what anti-
Americanism is.  
Recent research on anti-Americanism by Katzenstein, Keohane, Chiozza, and colleagues 
has sought to treat anti-Americanism more rigorously and more seriously in a social scientific 
sense, something that, with the exception of Fabrinni (2002), had not been done well in decades 
(Tai, Peterson and Gurr 1973).26 While this project disagrees with their assessments on the nature 
of anti-Americanism, it joins them in attempting to take the study of anti-Americanism away 
                                                 
26 Crockatt’s (2003) work, while offering valuable insight and objective analysis of anti-Americanism, is not strictly 
social science. It offers much in the way of discussion, but little in the way of testable theory and analysis.  
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from the direction of pro-American polemics that just happened to be printed in academic 
journals and by scholarly presses, as well as literature that attempts to argue, in the face of 
overwhelming evidence, that anti-Americanism is something that is more or less free of vitriol, 
and is an almost mechanical reaction to U.S. policy. The study of anti-Americanism needs to be 
treated seriously and rigorously in a scientific sense.  
On a Theory of the Nature of Anti-Americanism  
While we applaud the effort of Katzenstein and Keohane (2005), Chiozza (2005a, 
2005b), and their colleagues in treating anti-Americanism as topic of serious social science, this 
project has developed and tested a theory at odds with their assertions. This mainly reflects their 
arguments about the nature of anti-Americanism. Rather than numerous anti-Americanisms 
based on a careful evaluation of separate policy issues we have argued in favor of a anti-
Americanism that is primarily uniform in nature. We have presented evidence suggesting that 
rather than evaluating various aspects of U.S. policy, mass publics tend to conflate issue 
dimensions. Furthermore, we posit that mass publics do not tend to view America and the 
American people in different dimensions, as Chiozza (2005b) asserts. Roughly put, we present 
the argument that mass publics do not have the same complex, nuanced evaluations about the 
world as elite scholars in the field of International Relations.  
The argument of various anti-Americanisms perhaps reflects how mass publics should 
see the world, and think about the U.S., its people, and polices. The United States as a country 
and U.S. policy each have characteristics that are both far reaching, and qualitatively distinct. 
This includes purporting to value human rights, democratic institutions, global capitalism, 
religious freedom, personal responsibility, and upward mobility. These characteristics also 
include the perception of hypocrisy (rightly or wrongly) in matters of supporting dictatorial 
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regimes, supporting abusers of human rights as well as committing human rights abuses, 
selectively violating norms of international commerce when it is in American interest to do so, 
and promoting social inequality. Other alleged negative characteristics associated with the U.S. 
include arrogant unilateralism, negligence regarding the environment, promotion of Zionism, 
opposing Islam, implementation of the death penalty, and lack of concern for the poor. In short, 
justified or not, there are many reasons to like and dislike America.  
Therefore, there probably should be several different anti-Americanisms. If we are to 
start from the assumption, as Katzenstein, Keohane, Chiozza and colleagues do, that since the 
world is a complex place people will see it as such, and properly distinguish between aspects of 
the same object, correctly deciphering the various nuances and intricacies of world politics and 
the role of the U.S. into the political world, and comparing these assessments to their own values 
as a precursor to normative evaluations, then we will inevitably conclude that there will be 
numerous anti-Americanisms. However, in this project we make no such assumptions about the 
ability of mass publics to see the world in such complex terms.  
A theory of anti-Americanism based on the relevant cognitive and social psychology 
theory, leads us to a completely different conclusion. We argue that, despite what the shape of 
what anti-Americanism should be, it reflects processes of simplification that do not lend 
themselves to viewing various characteristics of the United States differently. Anti-Americanism, 
we have argued, is predominantly uniform. While it is certainly logical to evaluate the world in 
such a way as to isolate numerous different anti-Americanisms, our theory and findings have led 
us to a different conclusion.  
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Regarding Sources and Effects of Anti-Americanism  
Perhaps the most important substantive effect of anti-Americanism found in this study is 
the willingness to disengage from the greater international community. While this tendency does 
not necessarily lead to a sentiment of isolationism,27 it can. This possibility is plausible: as the 
United States is clearly the most powerful actor on the world stage in almost every capacity, 
negative evaluations of the U.S. should tend to lead one toward wanting to disengage from the 
greater international community.  
While the effects of anti-Americanism on willingness to engage are an important finding, 
it does not necessarily follow that the recent upsurge in anti-Americanism means Europe or the 
world will enter into a time of disengagement. First, while democratically elected for the most 
part, the political leaders of Europe are subject not only to public opinion, but their own political 
judgment. While they may face some public pressure to disengage politically from the rest of the 
world, it does not necessarily follow that they will do so. Second, we have not speculated on 
whether a trend of greater levels of anti-Americanism will override other processes that are 
making the world more and more interconnected, such as advances in technology and greater 
levels of global trade (Freidman 2005). These processes are very likely to more than make up for 
any effect higher levels of anti-Americanism might have. In short, there are too many other 
factors at play to speculate that new levels of higher anti-Americanism will lead to mass public 
disengagement, much less a world that is more disconnected.  
Interestingly, while the effects of anti-Americanism on less support for international 
institutions extend to attitudes about the European Union, anti-Americanism does not seem to 
affect attitudes about the process of political integration itself (chapter 3). This discrepancy 
between the European Union itself and the project of European political integration suggests 
                                                 
27 As noted in Chapter 3, it is also prone to lead to support for regional integration.  
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disconnect between what Europeans think the EU currently is (an ardent U.S. ally), and what the 
EU may become. The EU is certainly an ally of the United States. The finding that anti-
Americanism does not affect support for European integration itself suggests that some 
Europeans envision a world with a more powerful EU that is more distanced from the U.S.  
This supposition is reinforced by the finding that anti-Americanism siphons off support 
for supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with that support going to a national 
security arrangement led either by one’s country, or slightly more likely, the EU. This finding 
regarding NATO is probably the most important substantive finding on the effects of anti-
Americanism. NATO is more likely to be a political target than other international organizations 
for several reasons. It is a strictly military alliance with its transatlantic nature part of its central 
identity. The organization first invoked the “mutual defense clause” on September 13, 2001 in 
response to the terrorist attacks two days before. This clause states that an attack on one NATO 
country is equivalent to an attack on all its member countries. At the time of this writing 36 
NATO countries had troops in Afghanistan (NATO 2006), many of which had a hand in 
invading the country as well as helping the U.S. in its efforts to stabilize the former Taliban-led 
terrorist safe haven. In this sense, NATO’s most important covenant has only been explicitly 
used in response to an attack on the U.S. Also, unlike other international organizations, NATO 
has a potential alternative in the form of the European Union and its Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). This security arrangement is a central part of the EU’s structure,28 
although currently it is not very powerful at all (as illustrated by recent differences regarding the 
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq). It is certainly possible that a stronger CFSP might result from 
increased public antipathy (and possibly increased elite alienation) aimed at the United States. 
While a more cogent defense alliance based on the CFSP would certainly not rival NATO 
                                                 
28 The EU is currently made up of three “pillars,” of which the CFSP is one.  
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militarily, we should consider that conventional military strength may not be the most important 
factor for Europeans regarding their military alliances.  
Promoting the Positive – Soft Power and Cognitive Consistency  
One of the more disheartening aspects of anti-Americanism presented so far is how “all 
bad things go together.” We have argued that mass publics do not, for the most party, distinguish 
between various aspects of the United States, and instead rely on an overall negative evaluation 
that drives subsequent negative evaluations of completely different features. It might seem, then, 
that anti-Americanism is something that is hard to control. If this is the case, however, then we 
must remember that the same processes of cognitive consistency also apply the other way – all 
good things also go together. As we have argued previously, it is not the most negative 
evaluation that drives anti-Americanism (the environment), but the most salient (peace in the 
world).  
This has some important implications for exploring how the rising tide of anti-
Americanism can be countered. Both anti-Americanism and pro-Americanism, being different 
valences of the same concept, are both subject to the same processes that govern them. Thus, the 
process can decrease anti-Americanism by making publicly positive attributes of the United 
States more salient. The United States may well achieve its goals using military means, but such 
methods are not likely (to say the least) to decrease anti-Americanism. While military power 
may be necessary in maintaining world order, anti-Americanism cannot be fought with guns.   
It likely can be countered by utilizing “soft power” (Nye 2004).  Unlike hard power, 
which uses military and economic power to coerce, bribe, or otherwise overtly control, soft 
power is the ability to more subtly control, using “an attraction to shared values and justness and 
duty of contributing to the achievement of those values” (Nye 2004, 7). Although Nye sees the 
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concept as a means for the United States to achieve its international policy goals, the concept of 
soft power may also offer some key insights into decreasing anti-Americanism.  
Nye outlines several sources of America’s soft power. One involves education, which 
Nye specifically notes as important for increasing goodwill toward the U.S. The high quality of 
higher education in the United States offers a unique opportunity to foster understanding and 
good will toward the American people and the U.S. itself. Former Secretary of State Colin 
Powell commented:  
We are proud that the high quality of American colleges and universities attracts 
students and scholars from around the world. These individuals enrich our 
communities with their academic abilities and cultural diversity, and they return 
home with an increased understanding and often a lasting affection for the United 
States (Powell 2001). 
 
Chapter 5 previously noted the importance of the most politically engaged in mass 
publics and their tendency to “lead” public opinion. While not having perfect overlap with those 
more highly educated, goodwill toward the United States can be spread through social networks 
as a form of “social capital” (Lin 2001)29 that can decrease anti-Americanism.30 Certainly the 
spread of pro-American sentiments coming about through this specific process would have to be 
fully explored before an empirical relationship could be established, but at the very least the idea 
of relatively widespread American education in mass publics leading to less overall anti-
Americanism seems promising.  
                                                 
29 Social capital is somewhat of a contested concept in social science. While some scholars, mostly political 
scientists, put more of an aggregate emphasis on the term (e.g. Putnam 1993), many sociologists use the term to 
explicitly refer to access to another individual’s resources via social networks (e.g. Lin 2001). We use the latter 
conceptualization here.  
 
30 It is important to note this could be considered a bit of a conceptual stretch from Lin’s conceptualization of social 
capital. Lin specifically uses the concept to refer to an individual’s resources. We use the term resource broadly, to 
include knowledge and understanding of, as well as goodwill towards an object – in this case America.  
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Nye (2004) also notes the importance of American popular culture in establishing 
goodwill and understanding, though the effects are not as clear-cut. Nye cites the ironic example 
of leftist rap group Public Enemy actually advancing American political interests, noting how 
lyrics to their song “Fight the Power” were used by dissidents in communist Eastern Europe. 
While anecdotal, such an example illustrates the relatively positive attitudes toward the U.S. that 
exist to this day in Eastern Europe. While American popular culture is often portrayed in a 
negative light as decadent, immoral, and sexually gratuitous, Nye argues that on average, 
American cultural export of such seemingly mundane objects of consumption such as blue jeans, 
rock (or otherwise popular) music, cinema, and television and web-based media are by and large 
sources of goodwill toward American culture, and by extension, America itself.  
Domestic values and policies, according to Nye, also are important in promoting a 
positive image for the United States in fostering soft power. Chapter 4 explored the negative 
effects of certain U.S. domestic policies in regards to social welfare programs and possibly 
capital punishment, yet it is important to point out the perception of many positive attributes of 
U.S. domestic policy may have important positive effects. Europeans admire such American 
attributes as freedom of speech, the press, assembly, and other general principles that promote 
democracy and human rights within the borders of the United States. Other characteristics 
broadly seen as positive include cultural tolerance and diversity, the high potential for upward 
mobility, and the general American promise of opportunity.  
Perhaps the greatest danger to this potential source of goodwill is the charge of 
inconsistency and even hypocrisy. America’s domestic social reality still offers much fodder for 
its critics. Issues such as gun control, abortion, the death penalty, social policy, unwed 
motherhood, high divorce rates, poverty, and other perceived social ills cut into purported 
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positive aspects of the United States’ domestic policy cited above. Furthermore, the charge of 
hypocrisy has been leveled by Amnesty International at the United States regarding treatment of 
Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib and detainees at Guantanamo Bay (Amnesty International 2005). 
Whether justified or not, these charges of hypocrisy regarding purported American values carry 
weight, and are a very real threat to the image of the United States in the world (Katzenstein and 
Keohane 2005; Nye 2004).  
It is much harder to make the case that, on average, American policy is a source of 
international goodwill that can counter anti-Americanism than it is for American culture. Those 
wishing to blunt anti-Americanism by highlighting American policy must find ways to deal with 
charges of inconsistency and hypocrisy, either by providing compelling arguments countering 
such charges, or by addressing them in a way that will be seen as genuine and sincere. Despite 
the very best of efforts, however, the task remains daunting in this particular regard (Nye 2004).  
Promoting a good image of the America, especially regarding salient aspects of the 
United States will counter anti-Americanism. By countering negative attitudes about the 
America, constituting a point around which other characteristics of America will be evaluated. 
Through the process of avoiding psychological discomfort associated with conflicting attitudes 
the have different valence, people tend to make object evaluation parsimonious (as has been both 
argued and demonstrated in chapter 2). Simply put, positive attitudes about America on some 
issues correspond to positive attitudes on others. How these ideas are specifically put into 
practice is up to policy makers and diplomats.  
Final Thoughts 
In this project, we have sought to join other social scientists in outlining verifiable 
theories about the nature, sources, and effects of anti-Americanism. After reviewing the 
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important (if scarce) literature on the topic (chapter 1), this project we have outlined and tested a 
theory of the nature of anti-Americanism, looking primarily at Western European mass publics 
(chapter 2). We have demonstrated why anti-Americanism is an important phenomenon by 
outlining its important effects (chapter 3), and shown significant sources of anti-Americanism 
(chapter 4). We have also argued that, as a result of the events leading up to the invasion of Iraq 
in conjunction with the invasion itself, has lead to a new, greater level of anti-Americanism 
(chapter 5). We have concluded by proposing that the answer to how to counter anti-
Americanism is highly consistent with the finding of the main theoretical chapter. Anti-
Americanism can be offset through fostering positive, pro-American images and ideas. Very 
simply, positive views of the U.S. will counteract negative ones.  
Much work needs to be done in the study of anti-Americanism. While this project has 
sought to create and test a general theory of anti-Americanism, as well as outlining it sources and 
effects in ways that are applicable to the rest of the world, it has looked only at Western Europe, 
and mostly over the past few years. The ideas presented and tested in this project need to be 
applied to other parts of the world that have different cultures and different historical 
relationships with the United States, particularly parts of the world with high Muslim populations 
such as the Middle East and South Asia.  
Also, this project, while providing a general theory regarding the nature of anti-
Americanism, has only scratched the surface about the political effects and sources of the 
phenomenon. For example, what effect might anti-Americanism have on national elections, and 
in what contexts? German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder was widely said to have invoked anti-
Americanism in the form of firm opposition toward taking action against Iraq during the 2002 
election in Germany. Others have argued that an anti-American backlash occurred against the 
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ruling Popular Party government in Spain in the days after the March 11, 2004 terrorist attacks in 
Madrid, as the rival Socialist Party had pledged to remove all troops from Iraq. While these 
interpretations of events are certainly debatable, they do present promising areas where the 
effects of anti-Americanism on national politics could be further explored. As for sources of anti-
Americanism, more surveys could be done with the intention of, for example, fully exploring 
how an individual’s attitudes about U.S. domestic policy (e.g. the death penalty) affect anti-
Americanism. While this project has sought to answer compelling questions about the sources 
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APPENDIX: OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES NOT OTHERWISE 
SPECIFIED 
 
Analyses using Worldviews 2002 data: 
 
Age cohort: 1 = (18-24), 2 = (25-34), 3 = (35-44, refused, and “don’t know”), 4 = (45-54), 5 = 
(55-64), 6 = 65+ 
 
Ideology: 1 = (Extremely liberal/Extreme Left), 2 = (Liberal/Left), 3 = (Slightly liberal/Center 
Left), 4 = (Moderate/middle of the road/Center, refused, and “don’t know”), 5 = (Slightly 
conservative/Center Right), 6 = (Conservative/Right), 7 = (Extremely conservative/Extreme 
right) 
 
Analyses using Eurobarometer data:  
 
Fear of World War 3: “Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of. For each of 
these, please tell me if, personally, you are afraid of it, or not?” “A world war.” 1 = (afraid), 2 = 
(not afraid, don’t know) 
 
Fear of WMD: “Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of. For each of these, 
please tell me if, personally, you are afraid of it, or not?” “Spread of nuclear, bacteriological or 
chemical weapons of mass destruction.” 1 = (afraid), 2 = (not afraid, don’t know) 
 
Fear of Terrorism: “Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of. For each of 
these, please tell me if, personally, you are afraid of it, or not?” “International Terrorism.” 1 = 
(afraid), 2 = (not afraid, don’t know) 
 
Nationalism: “In the near future, do you see yourself as…” 4 = ([nationality] only), 3 = 
([nationality] and European), 2 = (European and [nationality]), 1 = (European only), 2.5 = 
(refused, don’t know) 
 
View of EU: “In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly 
positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?” 5 = (very positive), 4 = (fairly 
positive), 3 = (neutral, don’t know), 2 = (fairly negative), 1 = (very negative) 
 
Proud to be European: “And would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not 
at all proud to be European?” 4 = (very proud), 3 = (fairly proud), 2 = (not very proud), 1 = (not 
at all proud) 
 
Support European political union: “Are you, yourself, for or against the development towards a 
European political union?” 1 = (for), 0 = (against, don’t know) 
 
Satisfaction with EU democracy: “And how [are you] about the way democracy works in the 
European Union?” 4 = (very satisfied), 3 = (fairly satisfied), 2 = (not very satisfied), 1 = (not at 
all satisfied), 2.5 = (don’t know, refused) 
 
 131
Ideology: “In political matters people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right.’ How would you place your 
views on this scale?” 1 = (furthest left), 10 = (furthest right), 5.5 = (don’t know, refused) 
 
Analyses using Pew Global Attitudes Project 2003 data: 
 
Variables from factor analysis in Table 2.3: 
“And which of these comes closer to your view? I like American ideas about democracy, OR I 
dislike American ideas about democracy.” -1 = (like), 1 = (dislike), 0 = (refused, don’t know) 
 
“Which comes closer to describing your view? I like American ways of doing business, OR I 
dislike American ways of doing business.” -1 = (like), 1 = (dislike), 0 = (refused, don’t know) 
 
“And which comes closer to describing your view? I favor the US-led efforts to fight terrorism, 
OR I oppose the US-led efforts to fight terrorism.” -1 = (favor), 1 = (oppose), 0 = (refused, don’t 
know) 
 
“In making international policy decisions, to what extent do you think the United States takes 
into account the interests of countries like (survey country) – a great deal, a fair amount, not too 
much, or not at all?” -2 = (a great deal), -1 (a fair amount), 0 = (refused, don’t know), -1 = (not 
too much), -2 = (not at all)  
 
Support for globalization: “All in all, how do you feel about the world becoming more connected 
through greater economic trade and faster communication – do you think this is a very good 
thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad or a very bad thing for our country?” 4 = (very good), 3 = 
(somewhat good), 2 = (somewhat bad), 1 = (very bad), 2.5 = (refused, don’t know) 
 
Believe U.S. policy stabilizes Middle East: “Do you think US policies in the Middle East make 
the region more stable or less stable?” 1 = (more stable), 0 = (less stable), .5 = (no difference, 
don’t know, refused) 
 
Believe U.S. biased toward Israel: “What’s your opinion of US policies in the Middle East – 
would you say they are fair or do they favor Israel too much or do they favor the Palestinians too 
much?” 1 = (favor Israel), 0 = (fair, favor Palestinians, don’t know, refused) 
 
Support for Israel: “Which statement comes closest your opinion….” 1 = (A way can be found 
for the state of Israel to exist so that the rights and needs of the Palestinian people are taken care 
of), 0 = (The rights and needs of the Palestinian people cannot be taken care of as long as the 
state of Israel exists, don’t know, refused) 
 
Support for preemptive use of force: “Do you think that using military force against countries 
that may seriously threaten our country, but have not attacked us, can often be justified, 
sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified?” 4 = (often be justified), 3 = 
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